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Despite robust scholarship on the general themes of state-building, little scholarship 
exists on the strategies of exogenous powers on the construction of developing states. 
Further complicating these strategies is the influence of strong men, local elites who seek 
to mitigate the influence of both the developing state and the exogenous state on local 
modes of power and influence—often through the development of armed militias. 
Appropriating the construct of Barnett and Zurcher’s “peacebuilder’s construct” and 
utilizing the Sons of Iraq and the Afghan Local Police as case-studies, this thesis seeks to 
explore the current relationship between local strong men, developing state governments, 
and the exogenous state (or the “invited leviathan”) in two states where U.S. policy has 
dictated the deployment of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops. Powerful arguments 
can be made regarding U.S. policy in support of, and against, these militias. This thesis 
will show that U.S. empowerment of these militias can not only improve local security 
conditions, but it can empower disenfranchised groups at the state level. Understanding 
the dynamics at play in these circumstances can help inform the nature of future 
interaction with strong men, militias, and developing governments. 
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The Sons of Iraq (SOI) and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) have been viewed as 
successful initiatives that provide local security for the state by extending the reach of the 
central government. State-building1 and development scholarship, however, suggests 
these militias2 sacrifice long-term state development for short-term security gains. This 
chapter will explore the literature as it relates to state-building and war, strong-men in the 
development of the state, the phenomenon of the “invited leviathan”—a model developed 
by academics Michael Barnett and Cristhoph Zurcher called the “peace-maker’s 
contract”—which is useful for describing the factors at work between actors during state-
building and, finally, the case for the local militias and the case against them. 
The establishment of reasonable levels of security is necessary before a central 
government can effectively consolidate social power and enact economic reforms. In the 
case of the SOI movement, security gains enabled the government in Baghdad significant 
room to maneuver when it came to reconstruction, development, and governance reform. 
Furthermore, at a basic level, the empowerment of disenfranchised segments of the 
population (post-regime Sunnis in the case of Iraq) forced the central government to 
reach an accommodation with this population. The emergence of the SOI, supported by 
an external state (the United States), empowered the Sunni minority in such a way that 
the central government in Baghdad was forced to open a dialogue and concede some 
powers to them, thus integrating Sunni powerbrokers into the government and ostensibly 
making the government more representative of its populace—or at least of a group 
representing part of that populace.   
There are some indications the ALP could serve in a similar capacity to the SOI, 
by integrating disenfranchised Pashtuns from violent territory into the central authority 
                                                 
1 “State-building” is identified, at its simplest, as “the creation of new government institutions and the 
strengthening of existing ones.”  See Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in 
the 21st Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), ix. 
2 “Militias” are identified as a primarily political institution (rather than primarily military institution) 
which is part of a strategy of local rule and state-building. The goal of a militia is population control. They 
are sometimes called paramilitaries, death-squads, or home, civil, or village guards. See Stathis N. Kalyvas, 
The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 107.  
 2 
apparatus in Afghanistan. This seems unlikely for a variety of reasons (generally related 
to questions of legitimacy and the inability of the weak central government to reach 
isolated Pashtun regions with any regular effect), but at the very least, the United States 
and Afghan governments continue to hold the ALP as an effective local security 
apparatus. It is still too early to tell what influence the Afghan Local Police will truly 
exert on the security environment and to see if they will affect the neopatrimonial Karzai 
government, but possibilities can be illustrated via on-going operations and historical 
study.   
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Security from violence is one of the most important pre-conditions that must be 
established before executing the myriad operations associated with institution-building.3  
Counterinsurgent practitioners have long praised the positive effects local armed groups 
can have in terms in providing security, developing intelligence, providing secure bases 
for sustainment, and communicating the goals of the government to the local population.4  
It is therefore not a surprise that when local elites from the Afghan and Iraqi populations 
emerged who seemed able to exert local influence and provide security, U.S. leaders 
seized upon the opportunities these individuals presented. U.S. interaction and 
sustainment for these movements, as well as the U.S. role in facilitating host-nation 
support for these movements, was undertaken in an environment of immense political 
pressure, strategic shifts, and the natural frictions of developing states, which in many 
cases means that policy was disjointed, largely driven by personal relationships between  
                                                 
3 Robert Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), 3, states no political needs are as important as “human security.”  Army FM 3–24 
Counterinsurgency (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 43, seconds this, stating, “Without a 
secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads.” 
4 In 1940, the U.S. Marine Corps dedicated an entire chapter in their Small Wars Manual to the 
“establishment of an efficient and well-trained armed native force” (p12–2) including detailed sections on 
the creation of police, army, constabulary, and auxiliary forces; U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual 
(Honolulu, HI: University Press of Hawaii, 2005). In 1964 Roger Trinquier, advocated “strategic hamlets” 
as well as local armed forces which provide security for their own villages; Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A 
French View of Counterinsurgency (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 62–3. In the same 
year, David Galula indicated local armed forces may be useful but he saw them as occurring very late in a 
somewhat linear process after the defeat of an insurgency and during the process of re-establishing order; 
Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 
2006), 91.   
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U.S. personnel and local leaders, and executed with an aim of improving local security 
conditions in conjunction with a broader attempt to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) 
operations.  
When it came to the level of control the Iraqi state wielded on developing a 
democratic state, the effect of these militias likely was considered by U.S. forces, but 
such considerations were deemed less important than bringing a reduction in violence, 
and eventually, re-deployment of U.S. troops. Nor were such militias authorized by the 
Iraqi state until relatively late in the process.5  This was generally expected considering 
the fact that tactical and operational innovation in Army and Marine battalions and 
brigades was largely responsible for the growth of the most dynamic COIN policies in 
Iraq, including partnership with local militias.6  While it seems possible that more 
analysis has been applied recently to this phenomenon of state-interaction with local 
strong-men and militias in Afghanistan (for example, through the doctrine of Village 
Stability Operations), establishment of dominant local security has been generally the 
overriding concern when organizing these militias, while the long-term effect of militias 
on the state has been rarely discussed. 
Using the SOI and the ALP as case-studies, this thesis will examine the issue of 
local militias and their ability to impart or degrade state capacity. Can local militias 
improve the ability of the state to govern?  If so, how?  What can the United States do to 
maximize the state-bolstering capacity of such organizations in the future? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has embarked on some form or 
another of nation-building every 18 months.7  Therefore, lessons learned regarding the 
emergence of local militias and their ability to leverage support from local populations, as 
                                                 
5 Tom Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 
2006–2008 (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 164–5, 202–204.   
6 James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar 
and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 194. 
7 Robert C. Orr, “Introduction,” in Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict 
Resolution, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2004), x. 
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well as from central governments, are instructive to dealing with the challenges in 
developing states world-wide. This is especially pertinent when one considers that when 
outsiders impose settlements on post-conflict violence, more than half the time a return to 
large-scale violence is likely.8  
Corresponding analysis of this phenomenon can inform both academic and policy 
perspectives. This analysis is critical for understanding the current state of U.S. foreign 
policy regarding state-building, as well as toward the Middle East region in general. Such 
analysis may also inform regional U.S. military strategy.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. STATE-BUILDING AND WAR 
According to Charles Tilly, states (and their bureaucracies) emerged in Europe 
because of the need to extract resources from populations in order to finance the wars of 
kings and, as a result, the means of coercion, capital, and bureaucracy maximized at a 
centralized level.9  Although this is a useful way to view state development in the 
Western world, the effects that war and conflict have had on the development of the state 
in the rest of the world are disconcerting.  
Jeffrey Herbst notes that, in Africa, states have generally failed to conduct 
significant interstate war because of prohibitive demographic, political, and geographic 
factors. Lacking natural ethnic or linguistic unity, and furthermore being unable to use 
the mobilizing effects of war, these weak states cannot effectively establish institutions or 
economic mobilization because their populations lack the incentive to identify with each 
other or the state.10  In his analysis of South American state development, Miguel 
Centeno argues that states with limited resources (and/or limited extractive capacity, two 
deficiencies which are inextricably linked) are simply incapable of conducting large-scale 
                                                 
8 Scott Feil, “Laying the Foundation: Enhancing Security Capabilities,” in Robert C. Orr, ed, Winning 
the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Transition (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2004), 41. 
9 Charles Tilly, “War-Making and State-Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), 169–171. 
10 Jeffrey Herbst, “War and the State in Africa,” International Security 14:4 (Spring 1990), 117–139. 
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war-making. Therefore, conflicts between such states are smaller—and, as a result, South 
American states struggle to mobilize the economy or reduce social fragmentation.11  
Theirry Gongora suggests that since the developed states already monopolize production 
of weapon systems, as well as now-international bureaucratic systems, states in the 
Middle East are typically economically crippled by conventional warfare, since such 
warfare in the region has proven to be reliant on external resources and rarely involves 
mobilization of anything inside the state other than young men toward military service.12  
Tilly’s analysis appears incomplete when one attempts to use it to address developing 
states, however. As Michael Mann points out, most states have not possessed a monopoly 
on force and many have not even desired it.13  Therefore, in reality, monopoly over force 
is empirically ranked according to degrees rather than ontologically specified.14 
Diane Davis, in her discussion of urban violence in Central and South America, 
posits that Tilly’s central argument is true but it must also be understood that numerous 
groups use violence to establish their goals, and that members of society make decisions 
about which group to support based on a complex web of intersecting values, 
motivations, and expectations that very often have little or nothing to do with national-
level concerns.15  Anna Leander argues that in developing states, the ideas of capital 
creation and consolidation, extensive bureaucratic infrastructure, and extensive military 
power consolidated at the national level are not necessary and, as a means for organizing 
national strategies, are even counterproductive. In a globalized environment, external 
states and institutions like non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have the effect of 
reducing state influence and increasing the distance between the people and the state. 
                                                 
11 Miguel Angel Centeno, “Limited War and Limited States,” in Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. 
Periera, ed., Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in State Formation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 82–95. 
12 Theirry Gongora, “War-Making and State Power in the Contemporary Middle East,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 29:3 (August 1997), 323–240. 
13 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to 
A.D. 1760 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 11. 
14 J.P. Nettl, “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” in Wolfram F. Hanreider, ed., Comparative 
Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1971), 51–89. 
15 Diane E. Davis, “Irregular Armed Forces, Shifting Patterns of Commitment, and Fragmented 
Sovereignty in the Developing World,” Theory and Society 39:3–4 (May 2010). 
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Because the state cannot reach the population, pre-existent local elites are often 
empowered to engage the population on behalf of the state—including in terms of 
providing security and enforcing order. The power these elites exert degrades the 
capacity of the state’s military and police forces (if they even sufficiently exist) to 
provide security because the elites have assumed a competitor status with the state. If the 
state cannot offer functional security, the population lacks further incentives for viewing 
the state as anything other than an artificiality which provides no significant improvement 
to their lives.16   
Why do developing states struggle to implement coherent strategies that result in 
effective development?  Joel Migdal notes that states must have the abilities to penetrate 
society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and wield resources in 
appropriate ways.17  If states cannot penetrate society, due to the influence of actors with 
pre-existing influence, the state cannot implement its strategies.  
2. STRONG MEN AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 
As Leander and Davis argue, the success of state strategies often relies on the 
exertion of social control at a local level. Because society is a “mélange of social 
organizations”18 with competing interests, disciplines, and myths entwined throughout 
intersected networks of parties and personalities, social control is difficult to exert.  
“Strong men” 19—traditional leaders and interlocutors, whether tribal leaders, religious 
functionaries, warlords, or wise-men who have gained power through the maturation of 
their own survival strategies—exist within this social mélange.20  These individuals are 
extremely difficult to uproot from the social system, and strategies for establishing social 
                                                 
16 Leander, Anna Leander, “Wars and the Un-Making of States: Taking Tilly Seriously in the Modern 
World,” in Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung, ed., Copenhagen Peace Research: Conceptual Innovations 
and Contemporary Security Analysis (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 69–80.   
17 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 4.  
18 Ibid., 28. 
19 I will borrow Joel Migdal’s term for this class of individuals as they relate to state-building and 
attempt to use it as universally as possible throughout this thesis. There are also many other terms for these 
individuals, including “local powerbrokers,” “subnational elites,” and “armed non-state actors” (ANSA).  
20 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, 105. 
 7 
control by eliminating or co-opting the influence of strong-men are among the most 
critical strategies a state takes.21  Migdal states, “[T]he failure of states to have people in 
even the most remote villages behave as state leaders want ultimately affects the very 
coherence and character of the states themselves.”22 
Strong men are a naturally occurring phenomenon and may play positive roles 
across society and states. They are often needed to implement the strategies of the state. 
Whether it is because of a traditional reliance on kinship structures related to the clan or 
tribe, a distinct lack of developed human capital that can function as “implementers,”23 or 
any variety of other issues existing in an individual state, the capabilities strong-men 
possess may be exactly what the state needs. Further, whether the state needs them or not, 
the state may lack enough power to dislodge them. This is especially the case in 
neopatrimonial absolutist states (defined by Atul Kohli as states with “weakly centralized 
and barely legitimate authority structures, personalistic leaders unconstrained by norms 
or institutions, and bureaucracies of poor quality)”24 like Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, where anti-government insurgencies arrayed 
against weak central governments threaten the existence of the state itself, these strong-
men are extraordinarily influential. They often control access to the “second state,” or 
local, traditional networks, which possess both efficiency and legitimacy among local 
populations.25  They can side with the state or an insurgency, or their own side (whether 
via tribe, religious network, criminal syndicate, or other variation), and exert enormous 
influence in such a fractured and unpredictable environment.   
                                                 
21 Ibid., 22. 
22 Ibid., 5. 
23 Migdal argues the relationship between state leaders, implementers, and strongmen, articulated 
through his “triangle of accommodation,” captures the dilemmas all sides face while cooperating or 
sidestepping each other in order to implement successful strategies. See Migdal, Chapter 7, in Strong 
Societies and Weak States, 239–258. 
24 Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global 
Periphery (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 9.  
25 Eric Scheye, “Redeeming Statebuilding’s Misconceptions: Power, Politics, and Social Efficacy and 
Capital in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States,” Journal of International Peacekeeping 14 (2010), 248–
275. 
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In Afghanistan, U.S. personnel have worked with strong-men and warlords since 
2001 as a matter of strategy in order to defeat the Taliban and foreign extremists, 
therefore undermining the legitimacy of the central government.26  Over the subsequent 
years strategy has evolved, as have the actors on each side of the strategy. Despite the 
disruption brought to local patronage and client networks by North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) activity, strong-men, tribal networks, and provincial warlords 
continue to exert influence on the population—although Noor Ullah and Antonio 
Guistozzi argue that the legitimization of the state is increasingly tied to resources being 
funneled into the state from sources outside of the state, which has changed the nature of 
Afghanistan’s most influential strong-men.27  In Iraq, U.S. alliances with tribal leaders in 
Anbar province in 2006 improved local security but strengthened the grip local actors 
exerted on sources of power and influence.28  Strong-men have been empowered in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan.   
3. THE INVITED LEVIATHAN AND LOCAL MILITIAS IN IRAQ 
AND AFGHANISTAN  
Complicating the matter of strong-men even further is the phenomenon of Jan 
Angstrom’s “invited Leviathan.”  Externally-supported state-building (state-building 
resourced, planned, and executed by the “invited leviathan”) often creates a friction with 
practitioners attempting to execute policy in challenging conditions in local 
environments.29  The “invited Leviathan” further exerts enormous influences over the 
strategies of the developing state (the “home-grown Leviathan”). The danger, however, is 
that “the invited Leviathan may inadvertently weaken the legitimacy of the home-grown 
Leviathan, as the population may be more willing to consent to the rule of international 
                                                 
26 Astri Suhrke, “The Dangers of a Tight Embrace: Externally Assisted Statebuilding in Afghanistan,” 
in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, ed., The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions 
of Postwar Peace Operations (New York: Routledge, 2009), 230.  
27 Antonio Giustozzi and Noor Ullah, “The Inverted Cycle: Kabul and the Strongmen’s Competition 
for Control over Kandahar, 2001–2006,” Central Asian Survey 26:2 (June 2007), 167–184. 
28 Austin Long, “The Anbar Awakening,” Survival 50:2 (2008), 85–88. 
29 Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, “Introduction: Understanding the Contradictions of Postwar 
Statebuilding,” in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, ed, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the 
Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (New York: Routledge, 2010), 3. 
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forces. In this way, external military forces may undermine the state.”30 This is currently 
the case in Afghanistan (though the situation remains fluid), and in Iraq from 2003–2011; 
U.S. influence over nearly all Iraqi and Afghan policies is enormous. 
The problem of the “invited Leviathan” is illustrated through the rubric of the 
SOI. The SOI emerged in al Anbar province in 2006 and, by 2008, and grew to become a 
national movement encompassing around 100,000 Iraqis working as members of local 
militias providing security in their communities (they were mostly Sunni, and initially 
aligned with, trained by, and paid by U.S. forces). The predominantly Shia government 
resisted this arrangement, especially when U.S. leadership pressed Baghdad to take over 
not just responsibility for their organization and payment, but also integration into the 
broader Iraqi security apparatus. The government was disposed to see the SOI as a 
problematic armed group composed of the most militant of the former ruling elite. 
Conversely, U.S. senior military leaders viewed the SOI as important to the larger U.S. 
strategy in Iraq, because they were vital to the security of local communities and one 
pillar of the strategies, which apparently caused the largely successful reduction in 
violence across the nation which occurred by 2009. 31 
The United States has pursued similar strategies in Afghanistan. The quality and 
quantity of Afghan security forces have been a source of enormous tension between 
NATO forces and the Afghan government since 2002, especially when contrasted with 
the growing vitality of the Taliban since approximately 2006. A series of militia 
programs has been implemented since 2001, none of which has been particularly 
successful, and some of which have been notable for their public failures.32  The ALP, 
started in 2010, is only the latest incarnation of these programs. Though the Afghan 
                                                 
30 Jan Angstrom, “Inviting the Leviathan: External Forces, War, and State-Building in Afghanistan,” 
Small Wars and Insurgencies 19:3 (2008), 374–396. 
31 General David Petraeus, “Gen. Petraeus’s Opening Remarks on Iraq,” Washington Post, April 8, 
2008.  
32 Rachel Reid and Sahr Muhammedally highlight the successes and failures of the Afghan Military 
Force (AMF), Afghan Security Guards (ASG), Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), Community 
Defense Forces (CDF), and the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), as well as other precursors, in 
detail in their 2011 document. See Reid and Muhammedally, Just Don’t Call It a Militia: Impunity, 
Militias, and the Afghan Local Police (New York: Human Rights Watch: 2011), 15–49. See also Chapter 3 
of this thesis. 
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government has generally sided with the United States when it comes to the creation of 
these militias (some militias have been initiated by U.S. forces and some by the Afghan 
government), some members of the Afghan legislature and Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANSF), and many locals, have viewed these militias, especially considering the 
decades-long history of warlordism in Afghanistan, with distrust and frustration.33  This 
extends to the ALP. 
4. THE PEACEBUILDER’S CONTRACT: A MODEL OF STATE-
BUILDING OPERATIONS 
Michael Barnett and Christoph Zurcher propose a theoretical model of 
understanding post-conflict state-building, or what they call “peace-building.”  Their 
model is consistent with the ideas expressed in Joel Migdal’s “triangle of 
accommodation” but fleshes out the characteristics of this phenomenon more clearly. 
Peace-building is defined as an “effort to eliminate the root causes of conflict, to promote 
the security of the individual, societal groups, and the state, and to nurture features that 
create the conditions for stable peace.” 34  They argue it is not the same as state-building, 
because of the dilemmas that developing states always face—legitimacy and security. 
These are generally not pronounced problems in most other states where, Barnett and 
Zurcher postulate, actual “state-building” takes place. Peace-building, therefore, is further 
designated as a system of strategies by which outside states (or the peace-builders) pursue 
the improvement or outright construction of institutions within a state. The state is 
deemed effective if it can provide basic services and deliver public goods; it is also 
generally designed to be a liberal-democracy with inclusive institutions, rule of law, and 
market-driven development.35  This seems overly ambitious, but when one analyzes the 
examples of peace-building throughout the globe (Barnett and Zurcher specifically 
                                                 
33 Mathieu Lefevre, Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-Backed Initiatives, 
(Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2012); Reid and Muhammedally, Just Don’t Call It a Militia.  
34 Michael Barnett and Christoph Zurcher, “The Peacebuilder’s Contract: How External Statebuilding 
Reinforces Weak Statehood,” in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, edit, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: 
Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (New York: Routledge, 2010), 26. 
35 Ibid., 28. 
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address Tajikistan and Afghanistan), many peace-builders36 seem to pursue these 
ambitious designs and construct strategies which, in retrospect, seemed destined to fail. 
Why is this? 
This is because peace-builders are not pursuing peace-building strategies in a 
vacuum. They must address their strategies in an environment populated by state elites 
and subnational elites. State elites, however, will pursue their own interests, which may 
or may not coincide with the interests of peace-builders. The fundamental interests of the 
state elites, however, coincide around maintaining their own power, gaining access to the 
resources of the peace-builders, and earning recognition from both their population and 
the international community that they are effective leaders. Barnett and Zurcher posit 
four different outcomes to their model: cooperative peace-building, captured peace-




Unimpeded delivery of services and assistance leading to the 
creation of new institutions that distribute political and 
economic power to new actors 
Captured Peace-
building 
Local elites are able to shift peace-building programs and 
resources so that they are consistent with their interests 
Compromised 
Peace-building 




Peace-builders and local elites develop antagonistic and 
conflictive relations, leading to the suspension of assistance 
by peace-builders and active resistance by local elites 
Figure 1.  Kinds of peace-building.37 
Compromised peace-building is the most likely outcome to the game, when the 
outcome is decided between the peace-builder and the state elite. Partially because 
neither party is likely to defect unless the only outcome is confrontational peacebuilding, 
                                                 
36 By “peace-builders,” Barnett and Zurcher mean external states, agencies, institutions, or alliances 
which seek to establish “stability and liberalization.”  See Barnett and Zurcher, “The Peacebuilder’s 
Contract,” 24. This is consistent with the conceptual terminology of “invited leviathan” or external state-
builders. 
37 Ibid., 33. 
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each side is likely to settle on compromised peacebuilding as an acceptable outcome. 
This is because the peace-builder tends to view the deliverance of assistance as the most 
important of its responsibilities in the state, and other considerations, like holding 
complete autonomy over assistance, are secondary (in many real-world cases, in fact, the 
involvement of state elites in aid activities is desired). The state elite wishes to have both 
external aid as well as to exert as much control over the aid process as possible—since 
the prestige of the state elite is at least partially tied to the influence the state elite wields 
not just at the state-level but also internationally. Preferences are assumed as follows 
(Figure 2).  
 
Value Peace-builders State Elites Subnational Elites 
4 Cooperative Captured Captured 
3 Compromised Compromised Compromised 
2 Confrontational Confrontational Confrontational 
1 Captured Cooperative Cooperative 
Figure 2.  Rank order of preferences of different actors for different outcomes38 
Compromised peace-building often results in the peace-builder’s contract. An 
agreement springs into place whereby the peace-builder provides resources and 
legitimacy in order for the state elites to provide stability and implementation of reforms.  
“Consequently, this contract enforces the status quo even as it leaves open some 
possibility for reform. In other words, the reforms that do take place will unfold in a way 
that protects the interests of [state] elites,” Barnett and Zurcher state.39 
Subnational elites,40 however, further complicate the relationship between state 
elites and peace-builders. In obvious divergence to the interests of state elites, the driving 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 34. 
39 Ibid., 35. 
40 “Subnational elites” in this context are consistent with Migdal’s “strong men.” 
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interest of subnational elites is to uphold autonomy from the central government and 
sustain local power, which is in further contrast to what peace-builders want, which is to 
liberalize—with the pluralization of representation and centralization of power at the 
state level. Especially in collapsed or developing states, subnational elites often exert 
more leverage than either peace-builders or state elites, and they therefore might be able 
to deal directly with peace-builders in order to implement captured peace-building. What 
is more likely is that subnational elites will ally with state elites, or peace-builders, in 
order to coopt the process to better advance their interests.41  Ultimately, Barnett and 
Zurcher hold that liberal peace-building, because it is either compromised or captured, is 
more likely to “reproduce rather than transform existing state-society relations and 
patrimonial politics.”42  
D. THE ARGUMENT 
1. THE CASE FOR LOCAL MILITIAS 
As already mentioned, historical COIN theory has maintained a long recognition 
of the positive effects that armed groups can have on the local security environment. U.S. 
formal COIN doctrine is confused on this point, warning that militias “constitute a long-
term threat to law and order” while touting the establishment of home-guard units later in 
the same COIN manual.43  Nonetheless, the United States’s grand strategies in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan were dependent on the development of host-nation security forces in 
order to hasten U.S. reductions in force as rapidly as possible.44  In Iraq, this was 
generally perceived to mean formal security forces, in the sense of police and military 
forces, but as time progressed, the development of security forces (especially manning) 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 34–36. 
42 Ibid., 36. 
43 Pages 112–113 discuss militias as a dangerous outcome of weak governments which must be 
tracked like the enemy, while page 212 addresses home-guard units in a largely positive manner. See FM 
3–24, The U.S. Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2007), 110–113, 212. 
44 National Security Council, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, November 2005, 18–22; National 
Security Advisor (Gen [ret] James L. Jones), “President Obama’s Final Orders for Afghanistan Pakistan 
Strategy,” November 29, 2009, in Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2010), 
386–7. 
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remained uneven, and as political friction developed in the United States, it became 
imperative to seize the initiative whenever and wherever possible.45  Many U.S. officers 
perceived the militias that emerged as capable and effective at reducing violence, and one 
called them a “water-shed.”46  There is no doubt that the emergence of these groups on a 
wide scale, circa 2007 and 2008, coincided with a large drop in violence nation-wide.47  
It has been asserted that, at least in Iraq, these militias have increased democracy by 
enabling local populations to engage in non-violent, political dialogue with their local 
government, and to carry that dialogue from the local government to the central 
government.48  It further appears that in some circumstances, such armed groups may 
evolve into legitimate tools of the state, as long as they are perceived as professional, 
impartial, and adherers to the law.49 
As far as U.S. strategy in Iraq was concerned, these militias were useful because 
they helped establish local security. It is unsurprising that some have attempted to 
transfer similar success to Afghanistan. In fact, the Obama administration has recently 
announced that increasing financial and materiel resources are being dedicated to the 
ALP.50  Some scholars have long argued that the policies undertaken in support of U.S. 
strategy in Afghanistan have mistakenly sought to increase the power of the central 
government instead of empowering existing local governmental structures to provide de-
                                                 
45 General David Petraeus, for instance, in early 2007 directed the battalion executive officer of a unit 
responsible for the neighborhoods of Ameriyah, a haven for Sunni extremists in western Baghdad, to 
support a local militia organized against Al Qaeda, and to “not let up,” even in the face of bureaucratic and 
organization resistance from U.S. military leadership or the Iraqi government. See Linda Robinson, Tell Me 
How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq (New York: Public Affairs, 
2008), 238–9. 
46 “Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable with Colonel Martin N. Stanton, Chief of 
Reconciliation and Engagement, Multinational Corps-Iraq via Teleconference from Iraq Time: 12:00 Noon 
EDT Date Friday, November 2, 2007.” Washington, DC: Federal News Service, 2007.  
47 Greg Bruno estimated that violence dropped up to 90 percent in some districts. See Bruno, “The 
Role of the ‘Sons of Iraq’ in Improving Security,” Washington Post, April 28, 2008. 
48 Anthony E. Deane, “Providing Security Force Assistance in an Economy of Force Battle,” Military 
Review (Jan-Feb 2010), 90. 
49 Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Establishing the Rule of Law,” in Robert Rotberg, edit, When States Fail: 
Causes and Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 187. 
50 David S. Cloud, “U.S. Plans to Beef Up Rural Police Forces in Afghanistan,” Los Angeles Times, 
August  17, 2012. 
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centralized reach-back to the government.51  Furthermore, the fact that in some 
circumstances these armed groups appear superficially consistent with traditional modes 
of law and order in the region is often touted as a reason to empower the groups.52  The 
ALP has been argued to be an organization that can contribute to “grass-roots” local 
development, thus strengthening the links from local to central governance.53  One can 
argue, however, that the policies undertaken by both U.S. forces and the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) have diluted the strengths of these ideas 
and changed the ALP into something else.   
2. THE CASE AGAINST LOCAL MILITIAS 
Strong men, whether warlords, insurgent leaders, businessmen, religious figures, 
or tribal leaders, often find themselves controlling armed groups in fractured states. Once 
empowered, whether they seized power themselves or were enabled by outside powers, 
these groups become a political economy all their own, where they exert the influence 
(often through coercion and violence) to provide services and security to the 
population.54  The state is then subjected to recurrent spasms of violence as armed groups 
compete with each other and with the government, hastening state failure.55  Larry 
Goodson notes that since their goals are generally antithetical to the state, those working 
with warlords must plan how to dislodge them eventually.56   
                                                 
51 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “All Counterinsurgency is Local,” The Atlantic, October 
20, 2008, 16–17. 
52 Nazih Ayubi, for example, discusses tribal networks and the empowerment of chieftains to provide 
for local security as well as soldiery for the Ottoman empire; see Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State: 
Politics and Society in the Middle East (New York: I.B. Touris, 2006), 70. The arbakai, traditional Pashtun 
police serving the local tribe, are often cited as a historical precedent for the Afghan Local Police; see 
Mohammed Osman Tariq, Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan (Crisis Occasional 
Papers, 2008). 
53 Seth G. Jones, The Strategic Logic of Militia, Rand National Defense Research Institute, January 
2012, 29–31; Joseph A. L’Etoile, “Transforming the Conflict in Afghanistan,” Prism 2: 4 (September 
2011). 
54 William Reno, “The Politics of Violent Opposition in Collapsing States,” Government and 
Opposition 40:2 (Spring 2005), 128. 
55 Michael T. Klare, “The Deadly Connection: Paramilitary Bands, Small Arms Diffusion, and State 
Failure,” in Robert Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 116. 
56 Larry P. Goodson, “Lessons of Nation-Building in Afghanistan,” in Francis Fukuyama, ed., Nation-
Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2006), 153. 
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In discussing Iraq in 2011, Myriam Benraad argues that armed, trained, and 
empowered militias under the control of tribal actors pose danger to the central 
government that outweighs the benefits of such groups. She argues that tribal actors and 
other local strong men used the SOI movement to advance their economic, political, and 
provincial interests in the face of government attempts at central consolidation.57  
Afghanistan, a failed state that emblemizes the problems that arise from armed groups, 
has struggled with similar issues since 2001 (at least). Kimberly Marten, after analyzing 
the history of warlords in China and medieval Europe, contends that U.S. support for 
warlords and armed groups is mistaken because these groups maintain their influence 
only by impeding the very emergence of a functional state.58 
E. CASE SELECTION 
State development—the process of establishing social control, a functional 
economy, and effective institutions at the state level—is a laborious process. It is made 
more difficult with the presence of sectarian conflict, anti-government insurgency, 
degraded infrastructure, a lack of experience within the governmental sector, and the 
extensive presence of foreign military forces which lack intimate familiarity with the 
local language, culture, and political systems at hand. Even international peace-building 
efforts may complicate state-building efforts.59  Strong-men are another complicating 
factor. Scholarship suggests that strong-men impede the successful development of the 
state. Strategies taken by the state toward accommodation with or elimination of these 
strong-men has enormous effects not only on the exertion of social control (including the 
elusive “social contract”) but also, potentially, in the development of institutions and the 
economy.  
                                                 
57 Myriam Benraad, “Iraq’s Tribal ‘Sahwa’: Its Rise and Fall,” Middle East Policy 18:1 (Spring 2011), 
121–131.  
58 Kimberly Marten, “Warlordism in Comparative Perspective,” International Security 31:3 (Winter 
2006/7), 41. 
59 Barnett Rubin, “Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: Constructing Sovereignty for 
Whose Security?”  Third World Quarterly 27:1, From Nation-Building to State-Building (2006). 
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1. SONS OF IRAQ (SOI) 
The SOI60 program emerged in 2006 in al Anbar province as an armed militia 
largely organized around tribal leadership. As the financial and security-related rewards 
of the program became obvious to the local population, similar movements and programs 
spread throughout the entire country. These militias were composed of and eventually led 
by traditional leaders in tribal networks, as well as ex-Ba’ath officials and Saddam-era 
Army officers, local businessmen, ex-insurgents, and criminals—in short, by local 
strongmen who found themselves in a position to, with U.S. assistance, establish 
conditions of local security outside the established structure of the Iraqi state. While the 
positive effects of the militias on the reduction of violence were undeniable, the long-
term effects remain nebulous. Has the central government reached, in a legitimate, 
extractive, and reciprocal manner, the local populations in Iraq because of systems and 
policies built around the SOI?  Is Iraqi tribal culture consistent with the usage of local 
tribally-aligned forces?  What effect has the SOI movement had on the development of 
the Iraqi state so far?  How are strong-men empowered through the movement? Using 
Barnett and Zercher’s model of the “peace-builder’s contract,” are the SOI an example of 
cooperative peace-building, captured peace-building, compromised peace-building, or 
confrontational peace-building?   
2. AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE (ALP) 
The recent history of militias in Afghanistan is a violent and largely destabilized 
one. Since the 1980s, Afghans have formed and served inside armed groups for a variety 
of reasons associated with resistance to central authority and/or occupation, jihad, 
establishment of local stability, and sectarian concerns. Since the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001, and the establishment of the Karzai regime, local militia have been 
                                                 
60 For the purposes of this thesis, the author will use “Sons of Iraq” as the broad term used when 
referring to Iraqi organizations who acted to provide local security for their communities from insurgent 
forces from the period of 2006–2011. These forces have been known by a variety of terms in a variety of 
locations, including Sahwa, Awakening in Anbar forces, Concerned Local Citizens (CLC), and 
“neighborhood watch” forces, as well localized terms consistent with provincial histories. The movement 
emerged locally due to a variety of different circumstances and terminology for identifying it, 
unsurprisingly, was very local as well. Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) used Concerned Local Citizens 
as the formal term in published documents in 2007–8; the author recalls U.S. senior leadership calling 
militia members “Sons of Iraq” during his 15-month deployment in Kirkuk (2007–8).   
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generated, many with the support of the Karzai government or U.S. forces, in order to 
better establish order according to local conditions. The latest incarnation of this is the 
ALP. According to Barnett and Zercher’s model of the “peace-builder’s contract,” is the 
ALP an example of cooperative peace-building, captured peace-building, compromised 
peace-building, or confrontational peace-building?  Has the central government reached, 
in a legitimate, extractive, and reciprocal manner, the local populations in Afghanistan 
because of systems and policies built up around the ALP?  Is Pashtunwali61 consistent 
with the local militias—and are the militias currently in existence consistent with cultural 
mores?  What effect has the ALP, and myriad other militia movements, had in 
Afghanistan?  
F. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will include analysis of the literature state-building as it pertains to 
developing states, reconstruction, democracy, and legitimacy, particularly in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The bulk of the thesis will be written as a comparative study, using the SOI 
militias (circa 2006–2012) and the ALP militias (circa 2010–212) as in-depth “case 
studies” by which state-building literature and history in these examples will be 
compared. Data in these studies will be drawn from a variety of primary and secondary 
sources, including scholarly books and papers, articles and journals, published memoirs, 
biographies, testimony, and interviews, public polling/data surveys (if available), 
congressional and government reports, traditional media sources (newspapers, 
magazines, etc.), and commissioned policy and research documents (i.e., Rand). 
Conclusions will be drawn from the case-studies. These conclusions will be the basis for 
recommendations for policy or further research.  
                                                 
61 Pashtunwali, at its simplest explanation, is a “code of principles thoroughly rooted in the primacy of 
maintaining honor and reputation.”  It is by no means simple, however, and governs nearly all aspects of 
the daily life of most Pashtuns. While Pashtuns are perceived as the largest tribal group in the Afghanistan 
region, accounting for approximately 40 percent of the population of Afghanistan, not all Pashtuns abide by 
the code of Pashtunwali. The nuanced code of Pashtunwali is especially important to understanding the 
world-view not just of the Taliban but of the millions of Pashtuns who reside especially in the east and 
south of Afghanistan. See Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, 3rd ed., 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 59. 
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G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will trace state-building efforts through the phenomenon of the SOI 
and the ALP. This chapter has outlined the literature regarding state-building, strong-
men, peace-building, the “invited leviathan,” and the peace-builder’s contract. It also 
addresses the pertinent arguments in favor of and contrary to the subject of local militias. 
The second chapter is a case-study of the SOI, including the history of Saddam’s tribal 
engagement in the 1980s and 1990s, which helps explain the motivations of Anbari 
sheikhs when it came to interactions with U.S. forces, insurgent forces, and the Iraqi 
government from 2003–2012; this chapter concludes the SOI provide scholars with a 
clear example of compromised state-building. The third chapter is a case-study of the 
ALP, including a discussion of the traditional idea of arbakai as well as analysis of 
previous versions of local militias which have been used in Afghanistan since 2001, 
which concludes that the ALP have, in practice, provided scholars with another example 
of compromised state-building. The fourth chapter presents conclusions regarding U.S. 
state-building efforts vis-à-vis the ALP and SOI, lessons learned, and their applicability 




















II. CASE STUDY: SONS OF IRAQ 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter will address the tribal structure in Iraq, focusing as much as possible 
on the Sunni tribes, existing prior to the U.S. invasion in 2003. It will trace this structure 
to the Awakening movement (which began in 2006). This chapter will also address the 
relationship between U.S. forces, tribal strong-men in the Anbar region, and Iraqi leaders 
in Baghdad. This chapter concludes with the assertion that the SOI phenomenon 
comprises an excellent example of compromised peace-building.   
Why did the SOI come into existence?  More importantly, why did they succeed 
to such a large measure in 2006 and 2007?  Accommodation with tribal sheiks was 
recommended as early as 2003 by some informed commentators.62  Further, armed 
groups, drawn from the local population and which fought against the insurgency, came 
into existence in several locations earlier in the Iraq conflict but did not last long, let 
alone inspire a national movement.63  By late 2006 in Anbar, and 2007 throughout the 
entire state, however, conditions were ripe for the emergence of a movement composed 
of Iraqis who desired a new political situation. The relationship between the Iraqi 
government, the U.S. government, and the SOI provides an example of compromised 
state-building, and is therefore a valuable example for analysis. 
It must be clarified that the Awakening, and the armed groups that emerged from 
it, were a phenomenon linked to the specific political, tribal, and military situation in 
                                                 
62Michael Eisenstadt, “Conclusion,” in Michael Eisenstadt and Eric Mathewson, ed., U.S. Policy in 
Post-Saddam Iraq: Lessons from the British Experience, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003, 
74. 
63 Examples of early armed groups include a militia raised by the Albu Nimr tribe in 2004, the 
“Hamza Brigade” in early 2005 (a combination of Albu Mahal and Albu Nimr tribesman), the “Desert 
Protectors” (largely composed of ex-Hamza members) in mid-2005, and the Anbar People’s Council, 
largely composed of member of the Fahd tribe and linked to the 1920s Revolutionary Group, a nationalist 
insurgent organization. See Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Testing the 
Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” in International Security 37:1 (Summer 2012), 18–20; 
Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: Random House, 
2008), 24. 
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Anbar province. This Awakening (also called the Anbar Awakening or the Sahwa 64) was 
declared in September 2006, and was Iraqi-led. The SOI were an American response to 
the Awakening, in which tens of thousands of Iraqis nation-wide were armed and paid to 
protect their neighborhoods in 2007 and 2008. In both cases, armed groups took to the 
streets as an extra-governmental force to provide local security against terrorism and 
criminal activity, though in both cases they were integrated into the government, largely 
at the behest of the United States (the “invited leviathan”). 
B. TRIBAL RELATIONS IN THE SADDAM HUSSEIN ERA:  
Even though Saddam Hussein enjoyed little support outside of his extended 
family,65 the fact that he managed to maintain a grip on power at the state level for almost 
25 years is a testament to his masterful ability to carefully incentivize, manipulate, and 
co-opt factions. Through Saddam, the Iraqi tribes,66 already traditional sources of power, 
were able to secure local control, prestige, financial incentives, and even weapons—in 
exchange for acquiescence to his rule.   
Upon taking power in 1968, the Ba’ath party immediately declared itself a 
platform of modernization, and stood in opposition to the forces of tribalism and 
tradition.67  This reinforced decades of rhetoric by previous regimes aimed at destroying 
the influence that tribes held on society in competition with central governments. When 
Saddam Hussein seized power in 1979, Ba’ath ideology waned. Saddam was a product of  
 
                                                 
64 Sahwa is translated as “awakening” in Iraqi Arabic. 
65 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, 3rd 
ed. (New York: IB Tauris, 2001), 273. 
66 The definition of “tribe” is contentious. It is driven as much by colonial theory as it is by native 
ideology. I find Richard Tapper’s definition useful: “Tribe may be used loosely of a localized group in 
which kinship is the dominant idiom of organization, and whose members consider themselves culturally 
distinct (in terms of customs, dialect or language, and origins); tribes are usually politically unified, though 
not necessarily under a central leader…. Such tribes also form parts of larger, usually regional, political 
structures of tribes with similar kinds…”  Richard Tapper, “Introduction,” in Tapper, ed., The Conflict of 
Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan (London 1983), cited in Phillip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, 
“Introduction,” in Khoury and Kostiner, ed., Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1990), 19.   
67 Amatzia Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Policies 1991–1996,” 
International Journal of Middle-East Studies 29 (1997), 1. 
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a more traditional society in Tikrit (he was part of the Albu Nasser tribe, a sub-tribe of 
the Dulaym confederation) and never felt culturally connected to the more urbane 
members of the Ba’ath.68  
Despite the reality that Iraqi tribes have historically disdained the “flabby serpent” 
of central government,69 tribalism became a traditional motivation that Saddam used to 
appeal to Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds, and he used it to mobilize the Iraqi population during 
the Iran-Iraq war.70  Not only was Saddam pre-disposed to look favorably on the 
influence these tribes could wield inside Iraq, but when the tribes themselves resisted the 
Iranian military during the Iraq-Iran war,71 Saddam openly recognized this coercive force 
that he could co-opt in support of his regime. He went so far as to portray himself as a 
paramount sheikh. This was critical because after the disastrous invasion of Kuwait and 
the intifadah that occurred thereafter, in which many Ba’ath officials were killed 
throughout Iraq, Saddam sought to re-exert control by empowering traditional 
networks.72 
Control of the populace became even more critical after the disastrous invasion of 
Kuwait and the subsequent defeat of the Iraqi military at the hands of the U.S. military. 
At the end of Desert Storm, many Shia, encouraged by the United States, rose up against 
Saddam’s regime. Many rural people throughout Iraq stayed silent, waiting to see how 
strong the state response was before they chose sides.73  Some tribes seized the 
opportunity generated by rebellion and demonstrated their loyalty to the regime by 
                                                 
68 Williamson Murray and Major-General Robert H. Scales, Jr, The Iraq War: A Military History 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 25; Eric Davis, Memories of State: 
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spearheading attempts to put down these rebels.74  Even some Shia tribes supported 
Saddam in repelling the resistance.75  Saddam reciprocated tribal assistance in the 
preservation of his regime by appointing tribal sheikhs to serve as government officials in 
the provinces.76  Ba’athist order was subverted as many officials who were killed in the 
revolts were then replaced by functionaries who gained their influence through the power 
their tribe received from the Saddam regime. International sanctions, a result of the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, had an enormous effect on the regime. As a result, Saddam relied 
more intensely on the tribes, in some locations ceding local law and order as well as tax 
collection responsibilities to the tribes. He transferred “arms and ammunition, vehicles, 
and logistical support as payment for services rendered.”77  In addition, sheikhs received 
land and money for local development and arms (including heavy weapons like 
howitzers) for the purpose of maintaining local militias.78  Some tribes celebrated this 
relationship with the regime, even erecting road-signs declaring that land alongside 
highways in the northern part of the state was tribal territory (notably the Dulaym).79   
This relationship was necessary for the regime, which struggled under economic 
sanctions and continued uprisings throughout the 1990s; they lacked the resources to 
exert control throughout the entirety of the state and Saddam lacked trust in many of his 
forces. By endorsing Saddam, tribal leaders saw the opportunity to develop and exert 
influence at the local level. In this way, Saddam was able to create networks of patronage 
between himself and the tribes, empowering a group that existed outside of the “official” 
Iraqi state organization.80  Saddam formalized this relationship with the creation of an 
Office of Tribal Affairs and a High Council of Tribal Chiefs (a cabinet-level position), 
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through which he elevated some tribes to positions of greater influence, including the 
appointment of individuals to positions of leadership in tribes which they had not 
otherwise earned according to tribal precepts.81  This created a level of fragmentation 
inside the tribes that is still not fully understood, though it clearly failed to destroy the 
tribes as a powerful social force. 
This is not to say that all tribes were unstinting supporters of Saddam Hussein. In 
the 1990s there were at least four different revolts by military units largely comprised of 
three specific tribes—the Ubayd, Dulaym, and Jabbour, all of which are predominantly 
Sunni—which were put down by other security forces.82  As such, Saddam began to rely 
more on smaller tribes who were less likely to pose a threat to him,83 but the patronage 
networks ran both ways. It was difficult to entirely extricate his public support from some 
tribes and transfer it to others without degrading his own prestige or the level of support 
he received from tribal leaders. 
By the late 1990s, the tribes had taken on very public policing duties throughout 
the state. For instance, armed tribesmen were posted throughout the streets of Baghdad in 
1998 during tensions between Iraq and the United States over Saddam’s refusal to open 
weapons sites to international inspectors.84  Even inside the regime, urban Iraqis lost 
influence while Iraqis with rural backgrounds dominated politics in Baghdad. The 
Jubouri tribe (a Sunni Arab tribe from the “Sunni triangle” north of Mosul to Tikrit) 
dominated the highest levels of the military and that, with the exception of one 
individual, no one from Baghdad, Basra, or Mosul served in the highest levels of 
Saddam’s regime.85 Some tribes had assumed so much power that despite the 
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authoritarian nature of the regime, they were able to prey upon the population. The 
highway between Amman, Jordan, and Baghdad (through Anbar province) became 
notorious for armed bands from the Dulaym tribe who raided travelers in “broad 
daylight.”86  Criminal activity is consistent with significant elements of the Albu Fahd 
and Albu Mahal sub-tribes, both from the Dulaym confederation, who historically 
dominate regional smuggling networks.87  Under Saddam, these tribes found legitimation 
for their historical proclivity toward the control of local criminal enterprise.   
Saddam pursued strategies designed to split individuals from kinship groups, or 
elevate one kinship group over others, because he was determined to remain in power and 
had a tendency to view internal threats as the most dangerous to his regime. Baram noted, 
“(e)ven though this may indeed be a partial return to tribal norms in the tribal areas, this 
trend threaten[ed] when it permeates into the cities to become the undoing of the 
workings of the state.”88  These groups, composed of tribes and strong-men, posed a 
troublesome dynamic for Saddam—on one hand, they degraded his power and influence 
and posed a continual threat in Iraq’s hinterlands, but on the other, he needed them to 
maintain whatever semblance of control he could maintain. It is probably not a stretch to 
say that U.S. forces, in 2003, did not understand this dynamic or the true influence that 
many of the tribes and their leaders wielded throughout Iraq. 
C. THE U.S. INVASION  
The Sunni group identity had “always been intertwined with the state,”89 and with 
the rapid destruction of that state, their identity was altered. Furthermore, the influence of 
significant Sunni leaders and state elites was destroyed by a series of political decisions 
implemented by the United States  
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On 16 May 2003, Paul Bremer issued Order No. 1, “De-Bathification of Iraqi 
Society,” essentially outlawing the top four levels of the Ba’ath Party and forbidding 
them from posts in the soon-to-established Iraqi government.90  In the process of 
alienating the most experienced members of the formal economy, the United States 
disbanded the only established bureaucracy the Iraqi state had. These individuals were 
not only party functionaries and experienced bureaucrats, but were also school-teachers, 
electricians, doctors and nurses, and police.91  Many Sunnis felt the de-Bathification 
policies were aimed directly at limiting their own influence while elevating Shia power.92 
The United States compounded the damage on 23 May 2003 when Bremer issued 
Order No. 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” which disbanded the Iraqi military, defense 
ministries, and intelligence agencies.93  Even though many of these individuals had 
deserted, been captured, killed, or had otherwise disappeared from public view, the law 
meant none of them were paid or compensated, nor were retired officers paid their 
pensions, nor were military weapons collected in an organized manner. Iraqis throughout 
the state were incredulous and deeply frustrated. U.S. military officers and State 
Department officials were also exasperated as they received no warning and had no tools 
to offset the order. A plan to pay many of the soldiers, and especially the retirees, was 
hastily put into place.94 
In the space of less than two weeks, by seeking to “purge Iraq of Saddam 
Hussein’s malign influence,”95 U.S. policy had managed to disband the most significant 
functioning formal actors in the economy and the state government, as well as turn 
hundreds of thousands of trained, and in many cases, armed fighters, including their 
officers and strategists, out into the streets. The United States “showed little knowledge 
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of Iraqi society, the reasons why people had joined the Ba’th party, or even the role of the 
armed forces under Saddam Hussein.”96  Iraq already suffered from significant 
unemployment, infrastructure degradation, and lack of order. Crime, exacerbated by 
Saddam’s decision immediately before the U.S. invasion to release 200,000 convicts,97 
exploded. In this environment, it is no surprise that anti-U.S. opinion coalesced. In 2004, 
two-thirds of the Sunni population believed that the United States had invaded Iraq to 
humiliate the Sunnis.98  Sunnis further feared for their safety from Shia and Kurdish 
elites and largely Shia security forces, who sought retribution for perceived injustices 
after decades of repression at the hands of Saddam.99  Militias and armed groups sprang 
up throughout Iraq, led and organized by mostly non-state elites, attempting to protect 
vulnerable populations in ethnically-dominant neighborhoods, property, and access to 
resources throughout the confines of the state. Most of the major exile parties returned 
with their own armed groups. Two of the most rapid and most powerful militias to be 
established were Hizbollah in the southern marshes and Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-
Mahdi (JAM) militia. Although JAM was the most powerful, militant, and effective Shia 
militia, it was by no means the only militia organized by a religious figure in the 
aftermath of the U.S. invasion.100 
With the collapse of government power, already diminished state-controlled 
dispute resolution and routine function of social control disintegrated. Already influential 
because of years of Saddam’s empowerment, and because people understood sheikhs to 
be locally important and traditionally influential, much of society rapidly reverted back to 
utilizing the traditional tribal networks to decide issues. As one sheik noted, “[t]he tribes 
have always become stronger when the government is weak, and weaker when the 
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government is strong.”101  The revival of traditional networks required patronage; the 
sheiks needed (and had received from Saddam) “financial and material rewards to benefit 
them and that they can hand out to their tribes.”102  The problem was that, after 2003, the 
tribes could no longer gain incentives from Saddam’s regime, and they had to obtain it 
elsewhere.   
D. THE ACCENSION OF AL QAEDA IN IRAQ 
This chaotic environment was ideal for an organization like Al Qaeda in Iraq to 
seek and leverage influence among the tribes. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian who 
reportedly fought against the United States on the side of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 
2001, relocated to Iraq in 2002, and created a Salafi jihadist organization. He pledged 
himself and his organization, Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, to Al Qaeda in 
late 2004 (in the process U.S. analysts re-labeled the organization “Al-Qaeda in Iraq).”103  
Under his leadership, AQI recruited deeply from among the most frustrated individuals 
inside the disenfranchised Sunni society. AQI also drew a number of fighters from other 
states which were determined to fight against the U.S. occupation. There was fertile 
ground in Iraq for organizations like AQI because the “consequent alienation of Sunni 
Arabs from the emerging post-Saddam structure helped create a hospitable environment 
for the transnational jihadis whose interests came to converge with those of Iraqi 
nationalists and former Baathists committed to driving the United States out of Iraq.”104  
Jihadist organizations like AQI needed Iraqi tribal society to help shelter them in their 
war against the Iraqi government and the United States, and manipulated them in any 
way possible after the U.S. invasion in 2003.   
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Many Sunnis feared the Shia-dominated central government in Baghdad, and the 
fact that the United States seemed to support the Shia-led government over Sunni 
aspirations drove many Sunnis to accommodate extremist groups like Al Qaeda.105  
These accommodations were originally undertaken in an air of desperation, in order to 
hedge the influence of a Shia majority who was influenced by Iran, according to the 
thinking of many Sunnis in the rural parts of the country.106  Many Sunnis in Anbar 
province, at least from 2003 through 2006, saw U.S. forces not just as occupiers but also 
as witting or unwitting stooges of the Shia government. 
Many tribes—having the “natural reluctance of conservative Islamists and 
nationalists to submit to foreign infidels”107—resisted the U.S. occupation, motivated by 
resentment, lack of political and economic opportunity, and humiliation. Some tribal 
leaders played leadership roles in the insurgency.108  After 2003, support among the 
Sunni population for the insurgency was very strong; polling indicates that over three-
quarters of the population of Anbar province considered the central government in 
Baghdad illegitimate in 2006.109  
Regardless of their motivations or differences, cooperation evolved between the 
tribes and radical jihadists, though the true depths of this cooperation remain shadowy. 
The jihadists needed shelter, local knowledge, and material resources that could be 
gained from the disenfranchised Sunni population, while tribes needed funding, 
influence, and prestige.110  It must be stressed, however, that Zarqawi’s AQI provided for 
itself financially. Al Qaeda was never a monolithic establishment in either organization 
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or economics, and AQI, like Al Qaeda cells throughout the world, was forced to 
undertake a variety of moneymaking ventures in order to fund its operations. In Anbar, 
this meant AQI engaged in wide-scale theft and re-sale of stolen goods (especially 
automobiles and expensive commercial items like generators, construction equipment, 
and industrial items) and items stolen from victims of their violence. Their revenue 
stream in 2006 constituted nearly $400,000 a month.111  Reports indicated AQI was so 
financially successful in Anbar that it transferred funds out of the province to bolster the 
resources of cells in other provinces.112 
Even the nationalist and Ba’athist insurgent organizations cooperated with AQI in 
order to gain logistical, financial, and manpower support.113  To ensure wide-spread 
cooperation with AQI, those who resisted, including tribal leaders, were assassinated.114  
The central government exerted weak influence; in 2005, Ramadi had only 12 percent of 
their authorized police force in place (fewer than half of whom regularly showed up for 
work).115  The Sunni population as whole was increasingly intimidated by Al Qaeda in 
2003 through 2004 and 2005 into 2006.   
At the end of summer 2006, the senior Marine intelligence officer in Anbar 
province concluded, “AQI is the dominant organization of influence in al-Anbar, 
surpassing nationalist insurgents, the Iraqi Government, and MNF [Multi-National 
Forces] in its ability to control the day-to-day life of the average Sunni.”116  The 
assessment was that AQI simply could not be defeated in Anbar without a radical change 
in either resources or strategy. 
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E. FRICTION DEVELOPS BETWEEN AQI AND THE SUNNI 
POPULATION 
As time passed, other groups within the insurgency became increasingly 
frustrated with AQI propaganda, as well as tactics to exert control over the insurgency. 
AQI never dominated the insurgency in terms of manning or, likely, volume of attacks, 
and most estimates put AQI at very small percentage of the overall insurgency.117  
Nonetheless, the influence AQI exerted was massive, especially as the insurgency grew 
in intensity. An Iraqi intelligence officer estimated that by 2006 up to 60 percent of Iraqi 
resistance organizations were working with AQI.118  This was problematic because, as 
David Kilcullen, a COIN scholar who served as an advisor to General David Petraeus, 
points out, around 70 percent of Iraqi insurgents were motivated “defensively, out of a 
sense of threat and because of a belief that they had no alternative but to fight to the death 
to protect their communities in a terrifying and brutal environment.”119  AQI was 
offensive in nature, and increasingly so into 2006. This dichotomy put many insurgents 
increasingly into conflict with AQI. By 2005, rumors became public when some 
nationalist resistance groups let it be known that they disapproved of AQI’s incessant 
targeting not just of Iraqi security forces but also of Iraq’s Shia civilians.120  AQI further 
eroded nationalist collaboration by forming the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in late 2006, 
declaring AQI the leading organization in the insurgency and demanding that all other 
organizations pledge loyalty to AQI. AQI further intended to establish a return to a 
caliphate and declared it to exist in western Iraq. Their desire to establish a caliphate in 
Iraq clearly meant, to the rest of the insurgency, not only would there be no inclusion into 
the Iraqi state at all, Iraq would cease to exist. AQI over-reached by failing to understand 
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the nationalist, anti-U.S., secular nature of most of the resistance fighters.121 This caused 
the undercurrent of resentment against AQI to harden and explode into open warfare 
against AQI.   
AQI, whose conservative Salafi perspective on personal and societal behavior 
widely differed from that of the average Iraqi Sunni, believed it was important to control 
the human population through a strict adherence to sharia law—sharia law according to 
AQI’s harsh ideals. This included whipping those who consumed alcohol, breaking the 
fingers of smokers, and banning certain mundane products in stores because of perceived 
morality.122  This ham-fisted application of sharia law frustrated many Iraqi Sunnis, who 
were generally more secular than the hard-core foreign advocates who came to Iraq to 
fight jihad. Many perceived that AQI had evolved into a bigger threat than the United 
States. The Sunni population “reached a level of fear, desperation and exhaustion that 
made them amenable to having the American military in their neighborhoods. That had 
become a lesser evil than the presence of Al Qaeda extremists and Shiite militias.”123   
The tribal sheiks, many of whom had supported AQI, also grew disenchanted with 
AQI’s aggressive efforts to exert control over the population. AQI, with its emphasis on 
social re-organization according to radical Salafi ideals and its deliberate appeal to the 
most disenfranchised within Iraqi culture, acted as a revolutionary force. Sheik Ali 
Hatim, a prominent sheik in the Dulaim confederation, claimed AQI appealed to those on 
the bottom of the tribal hierarchy and attempted to use them to usurp the sheik’s proper 
influence over the tribe.124  Tribal leaders found the foreign-born nature of much of 
AQI’s leadership nettlesome. Many Iraqi communities were quite insular and sheiks were 
irritated by seeing young, uneducated Saudis or Jordanians exert influence in villages 
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simply because they were connected to AQI leadership.125 Furthermore, AQI pursued a 
policy in Iraq “to marry senior al-Qaeda fighters to local brides. The aim was to sow deep 
roots in a community. But in Iraqi tribal structure, ‘marrying women to strangers, let 
alone foreigners, is just not done.’”126  Rather than “sowing deep roots,” this marriage 
policy backfired by leading to deep resentment among many Sunnis, who saw AQI as an 
increasingly alien and manipulative organization.127  
Perhaps, most importantly, however, the friction between AQI and the tribes was 
born out of economic competition in Anbar. Much of this business was of questionable 
legality. The background of Sheik Abdul Buzaigh Sittarr al-Rishawi aka Abu Risha 
(hereafter referred as Sheik Sittar Abu Risha), the predominant sheik in the establishment 
of the Awakening movement, illustrates the friction between the tribes and the AQI-
dominated insurgency:   
After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Sittar is said to have made a fortune by 
nabbing cars moving along the unguarded roads of Anbar Province. As the 
insurgency began to take shape in Anbar Province in 2003, Sittar extended 
help to al-Qaeda in Iraq.... A former al Qaeda fighter who spoke to TIME 
on condition of anonymity says Sittar offered the group cars, safe houses 
and local guides for the foreign volunteers. But that partnership was short-
lived. When insurgents began raiding the highways as a means of 
fundraising, Sittar and his gang began clashing with insurgents in a turf 
war.128  
The tribes historically controlled the black market and AQI’s efforts to fund itself 
placed it in the same markets as the tribes. As such, AQI was disrupting the already shaky 
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sources of revenue, and therefore, patronage, that the tribal elites controlled.129  The total 
value of the black market that might have been controlled by the tribes has not been 
detailed, but there is no doubt that when AQI stole cars and construction equipment, they 
were interfering not only with the illicit but also the licit trade in which the tribes were 
involved. Reconstruction contracts, often set up between the United States and companies 
throughout Iraq, including Anbar province, provided lucrative targets for AQI to conduct 
“security shake-downs.”130  Many of these companies were owned by tribal leaders and 
other prominent individuals who lost money to organizations like AQI. Sheik Sittar Abu 
Risha, like many other formal and informal leaders throughout Iraq, realized after three-
and-a-half years of war that alliances with AQI were dangerous and unprofitable. 
F. THE SAHWA EMERGES  
The Al Anbar People’s Council, composed largely of nationalists, tribal leaders, 
and businessmen, emerged in the summer of 2005. Led by Nasser al-Fahadawey, the 
sheikh of the Al-Fahad tribe and himself closely connected to the insurgency,131 the 
Council existed as a sort of underground political party, publically organized against 
AQI, and sheiks from this organization met with leaders in the U.S. military, even 
including General George W. Casey, who warily attempted to ensure it supported the 
Anbari government.132  The Council was undone from within as tribal rivalries and a lack 
of both resources and resolve made them vulnerable to AQI predation. AQI assassinated 
tribal leaders and by the beginning of 2006, the Council had fallen apart.133  Another 
tribally-oriented organization functioned near the Al-Asad Airbase in western Anbar, but 
it lacked influence.134  While numerous members of the population, tribes, and elites 
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hated AQI and desired to re-exert traditional power structures and to strengthen their 
socio-economic power, it was not possible in Anbar, until 2006.   
By 2006, many tactical U.S. military units displayed the innovation and initiative 
to conduct operations more consistent with population-centered COIN operations.135  
Strategically, the United States had abandoned its “Iraqization” policy by 2007, realizing 
such a policy of training the Iraqi Army to take over the counterinsurgent fight could not 
be successful while violence was at such high levels, while the Iraqi Army as a whole 
could barely conduct operations in a competent manner, and when Shias and Sunnis were 
at each other’s throats. Inside the U.S. military, after years of conflict in Iraq, “[f]rom 
enlisted Soldiers and Marines to general officers, there was deeper experience; better 
equipment and training; better cultural and situational awareness; better doctrine; and 
better tactics, techniques, and procedures.”136  Ben Connable, a Marine intelligence 
officer with two deployments in Anbar by the time the Sahwa occured, argued the U.S. 
military took several years to gain the nuanced understanding of social and economic 
dynamics of Anbar province, especially when it came to tribal politics. With a few 
exceptions, before mid-2006 U.S. forces were unable to engage Anbaris, in language they 
understood and with incentives they responded to, in terms of the issues they were most 
motivated by.137  By mid-2006, forces in Anbar better understood the terrain they were 
operating in. This evolution in understanding made the U.S. military, especially the units 
aligned in Anbar province, exactly the types of creative, confident, and solution-oriented 
units the tribes would find success with.  
The unit that would partner so effectively with the tribes during the “Al Anbar 
Awakening” was the 1st Brigade of the 1st Armored Division (1–1 AD) under command 
of COL Sean MacFarland. When the brigade arrived in Ramadi in May 2006, the city 
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averaged three times more attacks per capita than any other location in Iraq, and was 
renowned as one of the most dangerous cities in Iraq.138  COL John Gronski, who 
commanded the U.S. brigade in Ramadi before the 1–1AD arrived, told General Casey he 
would need three times as many forces to truly control Ramadi. The 1–1 AD was 
bolstered with additional forces, including two extra battalions, before it arrived in 
Ramadi, which almost doubled its size.139  Undoubtedly, the increased volume of troops 
and assets than the 1–1AD brought to Ramadi, compared to previous units, greatly helped 
in terms of the ability of U.S. forces to develop profitable relationships with Anbaris. 
The 1–1 AD found itself in a highly kinetic fight against local insurgents, so they 
aggressively pursued these insurgents with all the weapons at their disposal. They also 
made a powerful example to the local population, renting or purchasing homes and 
protecting them so they could reside and patrol the neighborhoods where insurgents had 
previously reigned, and telling elites that they would not leave until the insurgents were 
dead.140 
As the 1–1AD pursued their own offensive in the summer of 2006, segments of 
the tribes were mobilized in open combat against the threat posed by AQI. Thawar Al-
Anbar (TAA) emerged as a local, anti-AQI, counter-insurgent organization in that spring 
of 2006. It was apparently funded and led by tribal elements which were determined to 
eliminate members of AQI in the Ramadi area. Multiple murders in the Ramadi area were 
attributed to TAA and the victims were identified by local elites as AQI fighters. It was 
clear there was a violent, if underground, tribal resistance against AQI in the Ramadi 
area. U.S. forces knew the TAA existed, but they did not assist it.141  At this time, the 
efforts to defeat the AQI-led insurgency were determined on the parts of both the Iraqis 
and the United States, but they were still uncoordinated and marked by a lack of 
recognition of interest or trust. 
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MacFarland went to the tribal and political elite and shared his vision of 
improvement in Ramadi. Many of the tribes wanted to support MacFarland, who, along 
with members of his staff, struck them as honorable, accessible, and deeply interested in 
what the tribes had to say. Sheik Khaled Arak Ehtami Al-Alayawia of the Abu Ali Jassim 
tribe and Sheik Sittar abu Risha in particular supported the 1–1AD. These two sheiks, 
especially Sheik Sittar abu Risha, a young, scotch-drinking, pistol-wearing chieftain of a 
relatively minor tribe with CIA contacts, a smuggling trade, and a flair for the 
dramatic,142 were charismatic and had been able to secure power and influence in the 
province for themselves after numerous other sheiks had been assassinated or fled the 
province.  
In the summer of 2006, COL MacFarland prevailed upon the Ramadi sheiks to 
assist in building up the size and quality of the local Iraqi Police (IP) forces. The tribal 
sheiks engaged 1–1 AD as soon as they arrived in Ramadi to set up armed, local 
militias,143 and the brigade saw the IP as a worthy alternative. (COL MacFarland, clearly, 
was not an immediate believer in the value of locally-raised armed militias.)  Recruiting 
was rapidly successful as over 250 police recruits joined in July alone (CIA cash bonuses 
to recruits likely assisted in establishing the rapid turnout).144  In terms of “official” Iraq 
security forces and the 1–1 AD, great pressure was put upon AQI. The TAA were also 
targeting AQI in the region.   
The tangible effect these efforts had on AQI in the summer of 2006 is difficult to 
determine. What is known is that by mid-August 2006, AQI released anti-TAA 
propaganda in several Ramadi areas, and also threatened the tribes who supported the 
Iraqi government or U.S. forces. In response, Sheik Khaled Arak Ehtami Al-Alayawia 
confronted Al-Qaeda fighters. He was killed and “[i]n a gross violation of tribal and 
Islamic custom requiring a swift burial,”145 hidden from his relatives and left exposed to 
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the elements by being abandoned in a field for several days. Earlier on the same day that 
Al-Alayawia was assassinated, AQI conducted a complex attack incorporating a suicide 
bomber on a local IP station, which largely failed in its attempt to intimidate the local 
population and local police.146 
Sheik Sittar was outraged by AQI’s activities and was clearly empowered by U.S. 
forces in the region. Though Sheik Khaled was not related to him, Sittar”‘ha[d] lost 
enough family members that he was ready to throw away caution,’” MacFarland said.147  
Over the following weeks, Sittar met with a large number of sheiks from the region, elites 
who rallied to his words.  “If we don’t stand up together, Al-Qaeda is going to pick us 
apart one by one, like they did last time,” he told them soon after the assassination of 
Sheik Khaled.148  On 9 September 2006, with COL MacFarland and a few other 
Americans in attendance, Sheik Sittar held a meeting at his compound with over 40 
sheiks as well as the previous Anbar governor, representing 11 of the region’s 21 tribes. 
The formation of the Sahwa Al- Anbar campaign and the Al-Anbar Emergency Council 
was announced.149  On 14 September the Al-Anbar Emergency Council held its first 
meeting and released points, including a return to “honorable status” for those sheiks who 
rejected Al-Qaeda, forming Anbar’s security forces (including IP, IA, and local militias) 
completely with Anbaris who have been approved by the tribes, providing security on all 
roads and highways, and opening dialogue with ex-Ba’athists.150 
Though MacFarland officially disavowed involvement in any U.S. interaction 
with the 1920s Revolutionary Brigade (a less radical and more nationalist insurgent 
organization than AQI) in the next several months, Sittar admitted privately to U.S. 
officers he had met with insurgent leaders and fighters, who had vowed to join the tribes 
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against AQI and to stop violence against the United States.151  The involvement of 
nationalist groups in the resistance is corroborated by another of the pivotal Sahwa 
sheikhs, Sheik Aifan Sadun al-Issawi, who also stated many AQI fighters quit and joined 
the Sahwa forces.152 
The Sahwa Al-Anbar  movement rapidly gained numerous adherents. By October 
2006, MacFarland estimated that almost all of the tribes near Ramadi, especially around 
the north and west, had affiliated themselves with Sahwa Al-Anbar and were in open 
warfare with AQI.153  AQI continued attacking coalition forces as well as IP, IA, and 
tribal forces; attacks remained high throughout the summer and into the fall. Some 
villages outside of Ramadi were particularly hard-hit, and some tribes tried to avoid 
taking sides in order to avoid casualties. 
In November 2006, a massive assault by AQI fighters on a neutral tribe, the Abu 
Soda, was repelled with the use of rapidly deployed U.S. air support and ground 
maneuver forces, causing the Abu Soda to abandon pretense at neutrality and 
aggressively join the tribal confederation.154  Called the “Battle of Sufia,” this clash re-
energized the tribes and showed them the United States would come to their aid if they 
just asked for it—even if they had not allied themselves with the movement yet. 
The tribes also supported official local security forces, especially as Baghdad’s 
rules were altered to support the tribal dynamics in Anbar. In a six-month period, over 
4,000 locals (90 percent of whom were vouched for by the tribal leaders) joined the Iraqi 
Police to serve directly in Ramadi. The Iraqi Army was able to accomplish an almost 
impossible feat in the same summer—recruiting Anbaris to serve in the Iraqi Army, who 
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had enlisted to serve under a special dispensation secured by 1–1AD so that they could 
serve in Anbar.155  By 2008, there would be over 24,000 police in Anbar province, 
largely at the behest of tribal leaders.156  Tribesmen received prestigious jobs with regular 
pay. Selected by the tribal elites, they served as the faces of authority in tribally-
dominated areas. Coalition forces had incentivized tribes by giving tribes sources of 
patronage.  
By the beginning of 2007, over 13,000 young men had pledged themselves to the 
Al-Anbar Emergency Council.157  Those local tribesmen who could not read and write 
(and were therefore not eligible to serve as police or soldiers) worked various security 
functions for the tribes, aligned in “reserve battalions” commanded by tribal leaders like 
Sheik Sittar Abu Risha. U.S. forces, understanding that tribesmen needed to work and be 
paid wages to stay on the side of the Sahwa (and by extension, the United States), paid 
them. In many cases, U.S. forces further equipped and armed these forces, and provided 
training to them. In some cases, these forces resembled “private armies” under the 
command of local Sawha commanders. Sheik Sittar Abu Risha himself worked on 
transforming the Sahwa into a political party and came into increasing conflict with the 
Ramadi governor—and, in a sort of sweetheart deal, was allowed to appoint the deputy 
governor.158   
By December 2006, the death rate for U.S. forces in Anbar province began to 
decline and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) sophistication evaporated—a sign that 
either the supply chain had been disrupted or skilled bomb-makers were no longer 
working within the cells that still fought the United States.159  Overall, attacks dropped 
from 25 a day in summer 2006 to four per day in spring 2007, a decline of over 
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80 percent.160  Cache exploitations increased161—which meant the population, no longer 
intimidated by AQI, was willing and able to provide good information to security forces.  
The insurgency itself was drained by the personnel requirements needed for the 
Sahwa. James Soriano, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) leader in Anbar from 
2006–2009, indicated tribal engagement began with the hopes of removing the young 
tribesmen from attacking Marines in Anbar province.162  Thousands of unemployed 
young men joined the IPs, the IA, and the local militias in Anbar during the Sahwa. This 
was critical because AQI considered the tribesmen the backbone of the insurgency in 
Anbar.163  The sheikhs gave tribesmen the orders to fight in 2006 and 2007 when it came 
to supporting the tribes and resisting AQI.164  If the Sahwa was “purely driven by the 
tribes and the sheikhs,”165 then the sheikhs had enormous power over the strength of the 
insurgency.   
“Their interests align with us—none of them is making any money during the 
war,” MacFarland said in 2007. He further stated that tribes, “like the Mafia,” owned 
many construction and contracting businesses in Anbar.166  By spring 2007, 
reconstruction contracts were vetted not just by local politicians, but increasingly through 
tribes. The Ramadi mayor was removed and a new leader—deemed appropriate by the 
tribal elite as well as U.S. forces—was appointed.167 Even more critical to the success of 
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the movement were contracts to construct or renovate markets, businesses, utility 
services, military facilities, roads, schools, and hospitals with which tribal elites were 
able to employ tribesmen and fund economic development.168  Because of U.S. financial 
support, they were able to reinvigorate the patronage networks. Social power was 
restored to the tribes in a manner the sheiks supported, and they gained the clear backing 
of the U.S. military.  U.S. forces were little interested in the personal behavior of most 
Sunnis in Anbar province and were tolerant of revenue-generating activities, as long as 
peace and prosperity appeared to increase in a measureable manner.169  The sheiks were 
back in control of the day-to-day life of their tribes, which was what they desired.   
G. THE U.S. RESPONDS AND THE SONS OF IRAQ ARE BORN 
With 2007 came “the Surge.”  The Bush administration, increasingly concerned in 
2006 that it was losing the war in Iraq, announced that U.S. forces would be heavily 
reinforced, new tactics would be utilized, and a new commander, General David 
Petraeus, would lead U.S. forces in Iraq. It was obvious that 1–1AD under COL 
MacFarland had done something impressive, a reversal in less than a year from a “lost 
province” to one which was the shining example of successful COIN. GEN David 
Petraeus met with COL MacFarland and sought to incorporate lessons learned in Anbar 
province to the COIN strategy the United States would pursue aggressively in 2007. 
The U.S. military immediately grasped the appeal of organizations like the Sahwa 
militias. Commanders everywhere went to tribal leaders, local businessmen, ex-military 
leaders, politicians, and other elites and endeavored to set up local security organizations. 
In January 2007, there were 12,000 SOI, mostly Sahwa militiamen, on the U.S. payroll. 
By May 2008, there were reportedly over 105,000 SOI.170  Concurrently, by spring 2008, 
attacks across the country had declined by a reported 62 percent compared to a year 
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earlier. 171 SOI were generally paid an average of U.S. $10 a day with an overall cost to 
the United States of $370 billion from 2007 to 2009.172  Retired GEN Barry McCaffrey 
spoke in support of the SOI in 2007, saying, “‘[w]e can pay them that [$10 a day] for 10 
years if we had to….Better we provide an infusion of cash where we’re keeping a local 
night watchman for us on duty than we conduct combat operations.’”173  
The Bush administration deployed over 20,000 more troops to Iraq in 2007 to 
bolster existing troop numbers. Combining the SOI with the increased number of U.S. 
troops meant security forces seemed to be everywhere. The Iraqi civilian population 
provided intelligence on insurgents, provided feedback on operations, and gave 
information on what the population needed. Much of this data was funneled through the 
SOI; “[t]he info we were getting from the CLCs [Concerned Local Citizens] was 
phenomenal,” claimed a U.S. Army brigade operations officer in 2007.174   
The emergence of these groups throughout Iraq was dependent on local 
conditions and local personalities. In Diyala province, for example, the “Baqouba 
Guardians” operated, less tribally-oriented but no less effectively, notably killing several 
AQI fighters, including two suicide bombers, in a clash on 15 August 2007. In Taji at the 
same time, the “Neighorhood Watch” numbered 500 and was more aligned with tribal 
leaders; sheiks were reportedly held accountable by U.S. leadership to enforce standards 
as well as ensuring logistical criteria were met.175   
The Farsan Al Rafidayn, or “Knights of the Two Rivers,” was a CLC group 
organized in Ameriyah, Baghdad, a predominately Sunni neighborhood with a long 
connection to the insurgency.176  They emerged from the split of nationalist insurgents (in 
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this case, Jaish Al-Islami or JAI) from AQI, and were “conspicuously non-tribal in 
nature.”177  Enormous successes were attributed to their tactical effectiveness. In 
Adamiyah, only a few blocks away to the northeast, citizens were “enraged by the news 
that terrorists had killed two relatives of a local sheik, [and] stormed the Abu Hanifa 
mosque, a known terrorist base. Subsequent operations allowed coalition forces to detain 
approximately 50 suspected terrorists and seize five large caches of weapons.”178 Thus 
was born Adamiyah’s own militia, the Critical Infrastructure Guard Force. In addition, a 
SOI unit south of Baghdad was commanded by a former Saddam-era general.179  
Although it was rarely articulated openly, most of the militias had deep connections to 
the ongoing insurgency.180  That is, many of the manning rosters of the various militias 
were composed of men who just yesterday had emplaced IEDs against American forces 
or had intimidated local populations. 
U.S. forces generally viewed the SOI and affiliated militias with something akin 
to respect—and relief. There was no denying that violence declined in areas where the 
SOI were stood up, but the correlation was difficult to prove. Were attacks down, for 
example, because unemployed men were now standing guard over their areas, so 
insurgents were afraid to attack there any longer?  Or were attacks down because 
insurgents were literally paid more by the United States than AQI (or other insurgent 
organizations) could pay them, and they therefore quit fighting, and were now standing 
“guard?”  There is likely truth to each side of this answer. 
If there was specific guidance or an order given to form or organize them from a 
specific U.S. military headquarters, there is official little record of such. The Special 
Inspector General for Iraqi Construction (SIGAR), who was tasked in 2010 to conduct an 
investigation into the usage of Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) 
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funds utilized for payment of these militias, found “there was no comprehensive plan for 
SOI with specific goals, metrics or milestones from which to measure the individual or 
collective impact of the effort. Additionally, there was no requirement for commanders to 
document what SOI groups achieved or for any other organization to assess overall 
program impact in areas such as reductions in insurgent attacks.”181  In short, the 
development of these organizations in locations outside of Anbar province was very ad 
hoc and informal.   
This is not to imply there was no understanding or control applied over the 
development of these militias from higher-level U.S. headquarters at all. Multi-National 
Corp-Iraq (MNC-I), commanded by General Raymond Odierno, did issue specific 
guidance. U.S. forces were directed to ensure that at least SOI were locally screened, took 
pledges of loyalty, and were entered into biometric databases. The capabilities of SOI 
were deliberately restricted, and U.S. forces were ordered to not provide arms or 
ammunition to the SOI. Numbers of SOI being paid and biometrically tracked were 
supposed to be reported to higher headquarters.182  GEN Odierno’s headquarters also 
issued unofficial guidance to commanders in the field. Odierno, while supportive of the 
concept of the SOI, recognized that many U.S. units were wary of the idea—some of the 
Iraqis joining these organizations had American blood on their hands, after all—and 
needed to be prodded forward, while other commanders and units might over-commit 
themselves to these organizations.183   
What were the effects of these organizations on the insurgency against the United 
States and the Iraqi government?  It is impossible to say, definitively. There is no doubt 
that, at least anecdotally, the SOI made great impressions on the U.S. forces as well as the 
Iraqi people; “Coalition commanders have repeatedly credited these forces for a large 
portion of the recent reduction in violence throughout Iraq.”184  One commentator 
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indicates, “[t]he program complemented the operations of Coalition and Iraqi forces, 
allowing them to accomplish far more than they could otherwise have been able to on the 
security front.”185  General Petraeus himself, upbeat about Iraqi prospects, indicated in 
April 2008 that between the SOI and “relentless” actions by the U.S. military, the threat 
posed by insurgent organizations, especially AQI, was deeply degraded.186  As the 
SIGAR report makes clear, however, there was no empirical evidence to prove the 
effectiveness of these militias, at least on a large scale. 
H. THE RESPONSE OF THE IRAQI STATE  
The Iraqi government reacted to the Al Anbar Awakening, the SOI, and other 
militias with suspicion. The Iraqi government was not even informed of the United 
States’ hand in building and financing the SOI until several months into its existence.187  
Though there was continual friction, the Iraqi military quickly cooperated with most of 
the organizations, seeing the same benefits to cooperation that U.S. units did—security, 
intelligence, the ability to reduce resources from such missions as force protection in 
order to shift them toward missions like hunting down and killing AQI leadership, and so 
on. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s government, on the other hand, was less happy with 
overt cooperation with these militias. It was obvious that a careful position needed to be 
struck—violence was down, and most of these movements represented a newly 
empowered Sunni minority—so reaction from Maliki himself was muted. Maliki had 
aggressively supported the Anbar Sahwa,188 where most people perceived the SOI were 
born, so he needed to tread carefully when it came to controlling these militia. The 
United Iraqi Alliance, Maliki’s Shiite bloc, issued a statement, however, insisting “that 
the American administration stop this adventure.”189 
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The members of these militias often failed to generate sympathy from the Iraqi 
government—at least partially because, in some cases, they refuse to acknowledge 
Baghdad’s sovereignty.  “One Fadhil [a neighborhood in Baghdad] CLC leader, Khalid 
Jamal al-Qaisi, has gone so far as to proclaim: “We are an independent state; no police or 
army is allowed to come in. The Americans asked to be our friends because we were the 
winners.”190  While most of the individuals associated with these militias did not endorse 
such incendiary sentiments, there was uncertainty with the government and within the 
population as to what these organizations truly mean to the local populations. 
As can be expected, the posturing within the tribes and other elements of Sunni 
communities did not end with the development of these organizations—in fact, it seemed 
to increase. Patronage networks, facilitated by tribal leaders as well as local businessmen, 
assumed prominence again. In areas where the tribes were already a predominant social 
influence (Anbar province, for example), many tribal leaders felt so strengthened by the 
process that they took actions undermining the authority of local governments.191  This 
prompted anger from Baghdad: “during a meeting in Al-Anbar with tribal leaders in 
October 2010, Prime Minister Al-Maliki chided the sheikhs to stop interfering in the 
security establishment’s affairs and to stop obstructing operations.”192  While the Iraqi 
government had tended toward clientelism since 2003, after the establishment of local 
militias, “with the blurring of the divisions between government, political party, tribe and 
private business, the form of [state] authority has been much closer to a condition of neo-
patrimonialism.”193 
Nevertheless, the state recognized the positive influence of these militias in terms 
of reducing the volume of violence, and agreed to incorporate them into the official 
governmental apparatus. Beginning in October 2008, the management and control of SOI 
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and associated militias was transferred from U.S. oversight to the Government of  
Iraq (GoI). This process included full registration and inventory processes, conducted 
jointly between GoI and Multi National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), resulting in over  
95,000 individuals verified as eligible for transfer. The second step, however, proved 
difficult; the GoI mandated that individuals not transferred to the Iraqi military or police 
(20 percent  of the total, according to the GoI) would be offered jobs in other ministries 
(the remaining 80 percent).194  Determining who could go where, to do what, was 
problematic. 
The GoI lacked the prerequisite administrative architecture to properly process or 
find jobs for the vast majority of these individuals. The GoI further lacked logistical 
infrastructure to pay or supply them. As the GoI has been aggressive about ensuring its 
security candidates are literate, many individuals were rejected for that deficiency alone 
(prompting many U.S. units to organize and oversee literacy programs). Literacy 
highlights a critical problem: in the government bureaucracy, there inevitably are limited 
positions available for young, uneducated, and inexperienced men.195   
From the early days of the emergence of the SOI, Iraqi officials repeatedly 
expressed concern about the quality of the personnel involved in the program, as well as 
recidivism and allegiances. That is, many Iraqis (especially Shias working within the GoI 
bureaucracy) perceived these militias as simply “amnestied insurgents,” collections of 
terrorists, mobsters, and strongmen who did not have the best interests of the Iraqi state at 
heart. This was valid criticism. Additionally, the Iraqi government pointed out that in 
many cases, lists of data (including biometric enrollments) were corrupted or simply 
erroneous, and in some cases, up to half the names submitted as belonging to local 
militias were fake, repeated, or otherwise false.196   
Predictably, the GoI has slowly dealt with these militias, causing frustration 
among the militias as well as the Sunni population as a whole. The militias have 
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repeatedly struggled with issues like late pay, lack of public support from the Iraqi 
government, and harassment by Iraqi security forces; some forces have threatened to 
walk off the job and rejoin insurgent organizations (who, for their part, have reputedly 
offered sums of money to the fighters they know most need it—when they are not 
deliberately targeting them with attacks).197  This prompted allegations of, at best, GoI 
incompetence, and at worst, GoI maneuvers to deliberately relegate the Sunni community 
to the status of irrelevant bystanders.   
Nonetheless, the integration of SOI into the central government has occurred, 
albeit slowly. As of June 2012, over 70,000 have been integrated into the government and 
another 30,000 continue to man SOI checkpoints (those manning checkpoints are paid 
about $300 a month by Baghdad).198  Many of those integrated and now working for the 
ministries have expressed frustration with their roles, feeling they are menial. Some have 
been arrested and charged with crimes by the Iraqi state.199  In the ongoing violence 
wracking the state of Iraq, the SOI continue to see significant attacks directed against 
them.200   
By 2009, the elites associated with the formation of the SOI formed blocks in 
influential political parties, some of which have achieved significant political success. 
The Sunni population has widely viewed the lack of support for the elections in 2005 to 
be a strategic failure. Unsurprisingly, these parties and factions are the strongest in Anbar  
province, but also they see compelling electoral performances in many Sunni-dominated 
areas of Iraq, including Diyala province.201  The SOI program has brought Sunni elites 
back into the formal political process.  
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I. CONCLUSION 
As of September 2012, the SOI remain in a somewhat nebulous position. Some 
are still on the streets, ostensibly securing their neighborhoods. Many have reportedly 
been incorporated into the government. The government continues to deal with tribal 
entities as a sort of extra-governmental entity upon which it relies upon for local justice 
and intelligence, as well as other functions.202 
When one examines the history of Iraq since the 1980s, it is clear the state has 
developed in coordination with the influence of local strong men as much as it has 
through traditional state-oriented power structures and central development. This is 
largely because the Iraqi state has not dominated control of coercive, legitimate force, in 
either the Saddam era or the post-Saddam era. Instead, those in power have delegated 
force to lower levels (in the case of Saddam) or they have empowered strategies which 
have the same effect (in terms of the SOI).   
In the case of the Sahwa, the U.S. “peace-makers” supported the Sahwa because 
they believed the tribal militias in Anbar province were exceptionally effective at 
reducing violence. The United States believed the Sahwa had the side-effect of bridging 
the gap between the central government and local government. This is because, with the 
help of U.S. units in Anbar, the tribal elites usurped the functions of local government, 
established local councils of tribal elites, replaced the Ramadi mayor, filled the police 
with tribesman selected by tribal leaders, and altered the central government’s policy 
regarding the destination of army recruits. By supporting this option the United States 
empowered a union of traditional strongmen.203  From a U.S. perspective, this was the 
best of several bad options.204  Nonetheless, this agreement gave the strongmen exactly 
what they wanted with little significant compromise. The agreement between the U.S. 
forces and Iraqi strong men resulted in compromised peace-building.   
                                                 
202 Tim Arango, “Iraq’s Tribal Chiefs Step into the Breach with Swift Justice,” The New York Times, 
March 13, 2012. 
203 Ricks, The Gamble, 206; Simon, “The Price of the Surge,” 61–62. 
204 Carter Malkasian argues this most cogently. See Malkasian, “A Thin Blue Line in the Sand.” 
 52 
The Iraqi government was originally dissatisfied with the prospect of armed Sunni 
tribesmen, but they were convinced to fund them and incorporate them into the central 
government at the behest of the U.S. government. The fact that the Iraqi government was 
weaker than the U.S. government, and dependent on U.S. support, was a determinative 
factor in their assuming responsibility for the SOI despite their misgivings. In this way, 
the United States imposed compromised peace-building upon the Iraqi government.   
The policies of Saddam-era government have therefore been repeated. Baghdad 
does not hold a monopoly on coercive power. Patronage politics have been reinforced, at 
least at the regional level. The tribes have re-exerted their role as spoilers on the Iraqi 
state, a role they’ve inadvertently played since the 1980s. A sectarian divide has lingered 
and even been enforced through the development of provincially-determined manning 
requirements in military units. These policies were not unforeseen; after all, they were 
empowered during Saddam’s rule. They are arguably artifacts of Iraqi “political 
sociology.”205   
Nonetheless, compromised peace-building has resulted in a greater inclusion at 
the national political structure for the Sunni community than at any other point since the 
U.S. invasion. Not only have SOI-linked parties gained representative power in Baghdad, 
most of those who worked with the SOI have been incorporated into the central 
government. With this inclusion has come more participation from the Sunni population 
in national politics. This has resulted in a more representative government. It is a 
government still beset with problems, including the ongoing insurgency, but a 
government with more promise than existed in 2006. 
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III. CASE STUDY: AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE (ALP) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
“[The Afghan Local Police] is, in essence, a community watch with AK-47s, 
under the local District Chief of Police, with members nominated by a representative 
Shura Council, vetted by the Afghan intel service, and trained by and partnered with 
Afghan Police and U.S. Special Forces elements,” explained General David Petraeus to 
the Senate in 2011.206  This chapter presents the case-study of the ALP in order to 
analyze the effect of local militias on the state. Utilizing the model of Barnett and 
Zurcher’s peace-builder’s contract, this chapter seeks to determine the effect of the ALP 
not just on the security environment but on the powers of the government. The interaction 
between the U.S. government, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
(GIRoA), and local strong men is complex and nuanced in Afghanistan, exacerbated by 
public perceptions of legitimacy and disparate views of the role of government.   
The ALP must be analyzed in terms of Village Stability Operations (VSO), a 
doctrine in place in Afghanistan to empower local governance. ALP is intended to 
provide security to villages which are participating in VSO operations. The ALP must 
also be analyzed in coordination with the history of the local security programs that came 
before it in Afghanistan. The cultural phenomenon of the arbakai will be examined, as 
both Westerners and Afghans often evoke the Pashtun concept of arbakai when it comes 
to discussions of locally-oriented armed groups.   
This paper will seek to describe the history and emergence of the ALP, including 
strategies of employment in some key locations. It must also be noted that this strategy of 
using local community-based militias to bolster security has already been pursued, in fits 
and starts, since 2001; with some discussion of the lessons of these programs included 
herein. The ALP program will be discussed in as much detail as possible here, but it is 
important to remember that not only is it a very locally-oriented program (that is, it is 
                                                 
206 “Statement of General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army Commander, International Security Assistance 
Forces, NATO, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 15 March 2011,” released by U.S. Senate 
Armed Services Committee. 
 54 
faced with different challenges and is built with different expectations in every location), 
but since it is relatively new (started officially in summer of 2010207), it has not yet been 
fully evaluated by responsible officials, and the literature on it is still somewhat sparse.  
B. THE AFGHAN STATE 
Afghanistan today is essentially a neopatrimonial absolutist state. Atul Kohli 
argues many developing states in the third world have “weakly centralized and barely 
legitimate authority structures, personalistic leaders unconstrained by norms or 
institutions, and bureaucracies of poor quality. These states are labeled here as 
neopatrimonial because, despite the façade of a modern state, public officeholders tend to 
treat public resources as their personal patrimony.”208  Such states, like Afghanistan, do 
little to draw the attention of their people to their state in a positive manner. 
Patronage networks are dominant in Afghanistan, functioning from the level of 
President Karzai down. This is largely a problem related to the construction of the formal 
state as it exists in Afghanistan (both currently and in a historical sense): provincial and 
district councils report directly up the chain of leadership to Karzai, have little impetus to 
respond to the desires of local citizens (since their connection to local citizens is 
irrelevant to their appointment to or responsibility to their post, which comes from 
Karzai), and lack control over local budgets or long-term strategies. Even mayors are 
appointed by Karzai.209  Karzai came to power with U.S. influence, but could only 
maintain it by recruiting and empowering existing strongmen; Karzai further extended his 
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reach through legal and extralegal means.210  There is no functional bureaucracy; instead 
a series of individuals who owe their position in the government solely to their 
relationship to Karzai, rather than having any particular merit or having been selected by 
a community.211  Karzai relied on traditional leaders, warlords, and tribal institutions only 
somewhat in 2002, but as time passed, the incorporation of these individuals into the state 
has increased through what at least one critic has argued are progressive stages.212  These 
warlords and militia commanders have degraded institutional development; institutions 
barely exist and what institutions do exist, do not reach into the villages of the rural 
areas.213  The construct of the central state actually requires strong men, warlords, and 
other power-brokers to join it or otherwise administer governance in local areas because, 
since they lack formal power granted by Kabul, they must possess significant informal 
power in order to accomplish governance functions.214 
Ethnic differences are a particular, deeply complicating issue in the Afghan state. 
As Thomas Johnson shows in his analysis of the 2004 and 2010 elections, Afghans tend 
to perceive themselves and, more importantly, choose leaders, based on predominantly 
ethnic considerations.215  This strongly implies Afghans tend to think about their interests 
as well as their future in fragmented, primarily ethnic terms that align poorly, or not at 
all, to the interests of the centralized state. In some sense, this is the way Afghanistan has 
“always been” but this perspective has been deepened by the failures of previous regimes 
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and further strengthened by the distance engendered by years of recent conflict.216  
Despite the weight of history being against the Karzai government, the Karzai regime has 
failed repeatedly to overcome historical prejudice against the government or to provide 
an effective alternative in the minds of the Afghans. As the elections debacle in 2011 
indicates, “[t]he increasing Pashtun tilt in key appointments reflects a four-year long 
trend in which Karzai has sought to shore up his traditional ethnic base with the perks of 
patronage even as much of the Pashtun belt sinks deeper into revolt against the Karzai 
government.”217   
Joel Migdal points out that compliance (the state’s authority rests on gaining 
agreement to its demands by the population), participation (systematizing the population 
in state-organized institutions), and legitimation (or accepting the state’s rules as correct) 
are the true indicators of the control a state has over its population. He argues that 
legitimation is the most critical of the three indicators—both compliance and 
participation often occur in any state through a rational evaluation of risks and rewards—
but legitimation is the most important and far-reaching indicator not just of a state’s 
measures of control, but of the very idea of the particular state in the population’s 
mind.218   
Legitimization is the most important measurement of social control, and the 
Afghan government exerts little legitimacy. The idea of state legitimacy was deeply 
important to Afghans in 2002–2004, but less so to the Westerners who were largely 
steering the formation of the government, and therefore generally ignored while they 
pushed, instead, an agenda of democracy.219  The West compounded the legitimacy issue 
by failing to follow up a stated commitment to the development and reconstruction of the 
government with significant financing or coherent, long-term, international strategies (at 
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least until 2008), though to this day economic strategies have remained flawed.220  
Karzai’s government, which has little extractive capability and little predictive income 
besides aid (which, as mentioned, was a pittance compared to what was required), chose 
to focus instead on the development of patron-client relations.221  That these relationships 
have involved the empowerment of strong men, criminals, warlords, and drug-dealers has 
not gone unnoticed among the population, and the Taliban have used this behavior as a 
significant aspect of their propaganda efforts.222  
The population, for the most part, has seen little reason to treat the government 
with any significant measure of legitimacy, since it essentially exerts no legitimacy. 
Arguably, “[t]he most important institutions are those necessary for providing citizens 
with security and justice: the police force and the judicial system. Yet these two are 
recognized as the most corrupt and the least effective by the Afghan people.”223  Since 
2001 Karzai himself has increasingly lost respect from both the Afghan people and the 
international community.224  This has led to an environment which is conducive to the 
return not just of Taliban resistance to the field, but of a popular perception among the 
population (especially the disenfranchised Pashtuns) that the Taliban, at least, are 
responsive, predictable, and honest. It seems likely that corruption drives as many people 
to join the anti-Karzai insurgency as any other factor.225   
C. TRADITIONAL LOCAL MILITIAS IN AFGHANISTAN 
Clearly, there are a variety of reasons why the International Security Assistance 
Forces (ISAF) have continually struggled with developing adequate security for GIRoA. 
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Foremost is that the central government is weak, with little extractive capacity226 and 
poor legitimacy within the population,227 and that President Karzai is perceived as 
passive, corrupt, and too willing to compromise and too unwilling to reign in abuses.228  
Further, there has been little consistent or comprehensive ISAF or GIRoA engagement in 
the rural areas, where the majority of most Afghans live. As Thomas Johnson argued, 
“[t]he U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is foundering because of the endemic failure to 
engage and protect rural villages, and to immunize them against insurgency.” 229  This is 
partly because ISAF itself has pursued a variety of strategies with little consistency since 
2001,230 other than a consistently expressed goal of attacking and destroying Al-Qaeda. 
Funding for aid and economic and development strategies have typically been lacking. At 
several points, the empowerment of warlords has been part of the U.S. security 
strategy. 231  The fundamental issue regarding security, of course, is that the Afghan 
National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) are not nearly as effective as 
one would hope they would be after more than a decade’s worth of training and spending. 
It must be highlighted that ISAF has continually attempted to improve the quality of the 
ANP, including a recent program intended to inculcate ANP across the country with 
“community policing” skills to attempt to bring the ANP into a partnership with the 
Afghan people.232  Nonetheless, significant issues within the Afghan police remain, as 
they are routinely involved in offenses ranging from theft, fraud, and blackmail to torture, 
murder, and collusion with insurgent forces. Some ANP units have defected en masse to 
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the side of the Taliban.233  The turnover rate for the ANA is so high that a third of its 
force consists of raw, inexperienced recruits, and it must put significant effort into 
replacing a third of its force every year.234  It is obvious that pervasive issues in the ANA 
and ANP, complicated by a future decline in security spending, will be impossible to 
change with any sense of rapidity.   
One stratagem designed to overcome the inherent weakness of Afghan security 
forces involves the development of local defense forces (the ALP) and their partnership 
with small contingents of U.S. forces (generally U.S. Special Forces), in order to provide 
security and assist in re-invigorating governance at the local level throughout 
Afghanistan. As Roger MacGinty argues, “[t]his contradicted the liberal state-building 
logic that emphasized meritocracy, but it satisfied a pragmatic security logic.”235  This 
tactic derives from the implicit recognition that the vast majority of Afghans live in rural 
areas236 and the politics of these rural areas, the woleswali, which are also locations in the 
district that are home to a single tribe or clan, are more important than the politics of the 
province.237   
Because tribes are often at war, long ago the tribes developed systems of 
defending themselves. Afghan local defense forces have as their traditional precedent the 
idea of arbakai, which is a traditional Pashtun security force drawn from a tribal 
community in times of stress to provide for security.238  Since Afghanistan has struggled 
with poor infrastructure, years of war, a lack of an inclusive government (since 
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essentially the late 1970s), and traditionally weak and disconnected means of rule within 
the confines of Afghanistan, many Afghans, and Pashtuns in particular, do not perceive 
GIRoA or any central government as having much legitimate influence, even over 
criminal matters.239  Partially because state structures in Afghanistan throughout the past 
hundreds of years have always struggled to extend their reach into these tribal areas, the 
implementation of security in these areas has remained quite literally in the hands of 
traditional leaders.240   
As such, the politics of the woleswali are linked to traditional tribal modes of 
governance. Since resources are finite in Afghanistan (including arable land and fresh 
water) and the tribes are often in conflict with each other, they have derived norms of 
behavior as well as complex systems of negotiation in order to mediate some of these 
conflicts.241  Tribal leaders, known as khans, work with designated intermediaries from 
the tribe to the government, known as maliks. Largely egalitarian councils composed of 
the men in the tribe, known as jirgas, are where true decision-making power within the 
tribe resides.242  Jirgas function because a basic tenet of Pashtun culture is that each man 
has equal power and rights as a Pashtun, and that the peace that exists between Pashtun 
communities is more important in the long run than the individual rights and power of a 
single man. The system is therefore inherently cooperative. Furthermore, it “emphasize[s] 
restorative justice based on local conceptions of fairness” rather than Western-style 
retributive justice. 243  After the 30 years of conflict, these traditional means of decision-
making have been frayed, but this is generally typical of how most tribal Afghans think 
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of traditional governance.244  This includes the Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan’s south and 
east, the portions of the country where the violence is most prevalent, and from which the 
Taliban draw the majority of their support. 
In these areas, especially in eastern Afghanistan, the cultural idea of an 
intelligence service exists, called the kishakee (which literally means “detection” or 
“detector”), which gives information to tribal leadership about the enemies of the tribal 
region. In response to data gathered by the kishakee (or from information commonly 
known), the chegha (or “call”) goes out from the tribal leadership to gather a defense of 
the people. The tribal leadership then, through the organizational auspices of a shura, 
organizes the fighters into arbakai,245 and possibly, into a lashkar. The arbakai (or 
“guardian,” but understood by most Pashtuns in a broader context of providing local 
policing) is typically used for securing local villages and sometimes for providing border 
defense, while the lashkar (translated as something like “large gathering of people”) 
serves as a show of strength or quite often as an expeditionary military force.246  Lashkars 
were raised in the time of the great 19th century Afghan ruler Abdur Rahman, for 
instance, and sent to serve in his armies as individual units.247  There is a clear difference 
between lashkar and arbakai in the minds of Pashtuns—arbakai are quite defensive and 
local in nature, while only the lashkar are used in a broader and more legitimately 
offensive manner. 
It must be stressed that arbakai have grass-roots support from the community. In 
addition, they are unpaid, and often unarmed, relying on honor and the implicit 
understanding of the shura’s expectations. They are not hired or contracted by anyone, 
including the central government. The responsibilities of arbakais change from location 
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to location and from tribe to tribe, but they generally exist to do three things: implement 
law and order, defend boundaries and borders, and implement the decisions of shuras and 
jirgas. Arbakai are called up on a circumstantial basis and are not conceived as a 
permanent organization.248 
Serving in an arbakai (for free) grants honor, while serving for pay (in the sense 
of a militia member) is shameful, according to some individuals in southeast 
Afghanistan.249  It is not a financial burden for a member of the tribe to serve in an 
arbakai since the shura which they answer to also levies materiel requirements on the 
members of the community to support the arbakai. Membership in the arbakai is very 
merit-based and a member of the arbakai must be “a good Pashtun”—honest, disciplined, 
and not afraid to protect the weak. The leader of an arbakai, called an ameer (from the 
Arabic word for “commander”), is selected on the basis of his respect for the shura and 
jirgas, his understanding of and adherence to pashtunwali and the tribal justice system, 
and leadership skills (interestingly enough, some ameers have reportedly been women). 
While the leadership of the arbakai is basically static, the membership in the arbakai is 
essentially part-time and rotates; that is, there is no standing arbakai of individuals who 
do nothing else with their life other than act as an arbakai. A Pashtun is part of the 
arbakai for a specified period of time and at the end of that time will go back to tending 
his farm or whatever he did before arbakai duty, and someone else will take his place. All 
families in the community participate in the arbakai by the utilization of, essentially, a 
“duty roster.”250  
Arbakais are not just a tool of the past; they have been called up and utilized in 
recent years. In 2008, arbakais under the control of the Mangal tribe in Loya Paktia 
implemented controls against insurgency and the drug-trade. In a notable case in Loya 
Paktia, a bomb-maker accidentally killed himself while constructing an IED; faced with 
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that evidence, the arbakai burned down his house and kicked his family out of their home 
village.251  They were thus shunned from the community.  
An examination of the facts reveals certain strengths and weaknesses within the 
concept of the arbakai when one considers the threat posed in 21st century Afghanistan. 
The arbakai maintain a deep connection to and support from the community, and their 
authority and responsibility goes both down into the village and up as far as the arbakai. 
Membership in the arbakai is based on largely ethical and cultural considerations; status, 
wealth, and background (including military or police training or experience) have nothing 
to do with it. The arbakai have limited duties and answer directly to the people through 
the shura, as everyone (who is a responsible, upstanding Pashtun) has the potential to 
serve in the arbakai at some point. They are uniquely suited to conduct enforcement of 
dispute resolution and local justice issues, especially in ways that resonate with a 
somewhat isolated, traditional population with customary, bucolic issues. The arbakai 
have no responsibility to the surrounding area, the district, or the province; there is no 
natural connection to GIRoA. They have no formal training in police or military skills, 
nor are they properly equipped for such roles—meaning they have tremendous difficulty 
combating a modern, violent, well-funded insurgency and adhering to modern standards 
of evidence and intelligence collection. Their justice is based on tribal precedents, 
Pashtunwali, and sharia law, all of which are effective for a local population which 
understands, respects, and prefers this law, but which quite often are not consistent with 
international standards of law, or even Afghan national law. The arbakai has little 
relevance outside Pashtun regions, and even inside Pashtun areas, it has less history in the 
south than it does the east. Perhaps most problematically, they are dependent upon and 
linked to the tribal structure in a village, which must be functional and effective. This is 
simply not the case in some locations, having been degraded after 30 years of civil war 
and social fragmentation. As Barnett Rubin points out, many traditional networks 
fragmented during the 1980s and 1990s as it became obvious that those who could relate 
to external state and non-state powers, and dominate access to their resources, would 
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control power within Afghanistan—therefore broadening the influence of Islamists and 
warlords at the expense of traditional khans and ameers.252 
D. GOVERNMENT MILITIAS SINCE 2001  
Partially because of the cultural precept of the arbakai, partially because of 
somewhat related examples elsewhere in history (including the Sons of Iraq), and simply 
because this is a compelling idea to pursue in a place faced with a lack of security, ISAF 
and organizations associated with ISAF have been determined to build and implement a 
functional system for local community policy since 2001. Since 2001, at least 50 of these 
programs had been implemented by early 2011 alone.253  GIRoA and local Afghan 
rhetorical and materiel support for these programs has varied widely.   
The Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) was one of these programs. It was 
created in 2005 over the objections of many international law enforcement professionals, 
who assessed it was doomed to failure. The ANAP took approximately 11,000 young 
men, put them through 10 days of training, gave them a uniform and an AK47, paid them 
a modest stipend, and posted them in locations where security was particularly poor. 
Predictably, they struggled intensely with discipline, including issues related to literacy 
and drug addiction. Many recruits were selected through nepotism and the loyalty of most 
recruits was questionable.254  They experienced enormous problems with planning, 
logistics, resources, understanding their own capabilities and limitations, and execution 
of missions. Many ANAP were predatory and it was commonly known among ISAF and 
GIRoA that many were illegally “taxing” the population and muscling in on trade. In 
some locations, ANAP squads engaged in firefights with other ANAP squads over “turf,” 
and in some locations they were co-opted by the insurgency or drug networks. U.S. 
General Robert Cone admitted, “What we saw was that the effect of paying people to 
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support us when we needed them, despite the positive impact over time, also had the 
effect of arming people who were not necessarily in line with the government.”255  By 
2008, many of them were incorporated into real ANP training programs, while “[o]thers, 
considered unsuitable or unable to find positions in the new tashkeel,256 were simply let 
go, with no apparent efforts to disarm them.” 257  In 2008, the program was officially shut 
down. 
The Community Defense Forces (CDF) was created in 2009 to provide security 
for the upcoming national elections. They numbered about 10,000 individuals, and were 
intended to be postured in locations where security lacked. Mohammad Arif Noorzai was 
appointed to run it; he was viewed “as a Karzai ally and a member of a powerful family 
that is notorious for its involvement in the narcotics trade.”258  One of his subordinates 
bragged about securing over 30,000 votes for Karzai.259  It was funded only months 
before the elections, poorly organized, and even more poorly executed. 
The Afghan Public Protection Program, or AP3, was designed, organized, and put 
into place by the U.S. military in 2009, although the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) soon 
bought in. It was designed to provide for local security, specifically along the lines of 
protecting local infrastructure, and was a response to Taliban activity in Wardak 
province.260  It was contentious from the beginning; the Wardak governor claims tribal 
leaders came to him and demanded an effective program they could have some hand in, 
while the local population complained in a public hearing on AP3 that they had never 
asked for it, and it was a poor substitute for increased ANP and ANA presence, which 
they really wanted. A shura process was supposed to be in place to ensure recruits were 
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vetted through local leaders.261  The program was desired to be a district-level program, 
wherein the individuals in each district would answer to the district ANP chief.262 
The program fell apart when Gulam Mohammed joined the AP3 as the provincial 
commander. Gulam, a former jihadi who led a group of 3,000 men first for Hizb-e-Islami 
in the 1990s and then for the Taliban, and who had spent two years in ISAF detention 
from 2004 to 2006, was apparently recruited by SOF to serve in this position, and 
supported by the provincial governor, who made him report directly to him and therefore 
avoid interaction with ANP or shura leadership.  (Gulam would claim in public forums 
that he worked for SOF and he and his men did not answer to GIRoA at all). More 
problematically, Gulam brought along 500 Pashtun fighters, almost all of whom were 
reportedly former Taliban, who were sped through the investigation process without 
proper vetting. Local Afghans felt Gulam, his men, and the AP3 program were tainted. 
Allegations of anti-Pashtun abusive behavior and overt nepotism were common.263  In 
2010, the AP3 in Wardak was converted to ALP. 
The true precursor to the ALP, however, is the Community Defense Initiative 
(CDI).264  Largely established by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) through SOF’s 
VSO, CDI was established in locations where there was little or no ANSF, where SOF 
could partner with them, and where the local population asked for them to exist. For VSO 
to function optimally in terms of bringing security to a local populace, the population 
must choose to develop and support a local security force.265  
The Afghan government was originally resistant to the idea of the CDI, seeing 
them not only as an arbitrary creation of SOF likely to be hoisted upon GIRoA (to draw, 
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therefore, more GIRoA funding and more man-power, thus generating more management 
problems), but also because none of the previous examples of local defense organizations 
had performed very well. Nonetheless, by late 2009, GIRoA has accepted responsibility 
for the CDI, most of which have since been incorporated into the ALP. 
Since 2001, most of these militias struggled to attain any sort of success in local 
security. They were mostly top-down initiatives (proposed by higher-ranking U.S. 
military headquarters and personnel), and sometimes even lacked cooperation and 
funding from other U.S. agencies. The Afghan government also routinely lacked genuine 
support for these programs.266 
E. THE ALP EMERGES  
U.S. forces examined the history of militia forces in Afghanistan in 2009. They 
researched the failings of previous programs, and they researched the culture of 
traditional village protection systems in Afghan history, including the arbakai. Some of 
the precepts of the CDI program were adopted, and incorporated with the doctrine of 
VSO. This revamped militia program was called the ALP, and briefed to GIRoA.267 
On 16 August 2010, the ALP was established by President Hamid Karzai. The 
ALP is officially supposed to report to the Ministry of the Interior via District ANP chiefs 
and local jirgas ostensibly decide on the manning of the organization. The ALP is 
intended to consolidate all known village defense programs across the nation. Although 
U.S. pays for it (in 2011 Congress has secured funding for up to 30,000 ALPs),268 this 
funding is funneled through the MOI and the program is generally acknowledged to be an 
Afghan program.269  As with all military plans in Afghanistan, implementation varies 
widely from location to location, with fascinating results. 
The ALP starts with an understanding consistent with traditional Afghan society, 
where power rests not in a person or a place, but “in an elusive network, which needs 
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constant maintenance and reconstruction.”270  This is conceptually similar to the 
woleswali. Since 2001, as Thomas Johnson notes, “the woleswali are last, not first, in 
U.S. military and political strategy.”271  In contrast, Johnson’s “expanded inkblot 
strategy,” which has already been adopted in modified form in several locations 
throughout Afghanistan, looks something like the ALP program. Johnson advocated that 
200 villages, nation-wide, were chosen, based on importance to the local districts and 
assumedly the importance to Afghan success, then supported with approximately 100 
ISAF security personnel and 30–40 ANA. The point, Johnson indicates, is that, “[t]he 
troops would provide a steady security presence, strengthen the position of tribal elders, 
and bolster the district police.” A key difference between Johnson’s program and the 
ALP is that Johnson’s program would incorporate ANA (which is what many local 
leaders say they want), rather than locally recruited individuals to serve in a new 
organization.272  
Consistent with these ideas but advocated concurrently, U.S. SOF in 2009 began 
advocating the usage of VSO.   
VSO are specifically oriented toward insurgent-controlled or -contested 
rural areas where there exist limited or no military or police elements of 
the Afghan National Security Forces, or ANSF. VSO enable local security 
and re-establish or re-empower traditional local governance mechanisms 
that represent the populations, such as shuras and jirgas (decision-making 
councils), and that promote critical local development to improve the 
quality of life within village communities and districts. In theory and 
practice, SOF efforts at the village level expand to connect village clusters 
upward to local district centers, while national-level governance efforts 
connect downward to provincial centers and then to district-level 
centers.273 
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The strength of both the ALP and VSO is in keeping the footprint small and in 
focusing at the village level. As Matt Dearing argues, the ALP is “created within a 
framework that is founded upon security, development, and governance via the Village 
Stability Operations. VSO engages with civilian, government, and other local actors to 
bridge informal structures at the local level with more formal structures at the district and 
provincial level.  The long-term capacity of ALP will be dependent upon the viability and 
resourcing of VSO as the primary infrastructure of paramilitary organization.”274 
The thinking is that when individuals at the village level are secure and see that 
forces are there and willing to do what needs to be done regarding local development, 
they will commit to governance. This is generally consistent with COIN theory. Instead 
of the ANA or ANP, would it be even more effective if local forces from the villages, 
who know the human and physical terrain intimately and who have deeper motivation to 
succeed at providing local security, were instead recruited to secure the villages?  That is 
the idea of the ALP. 
ALP recruits must be nominated by local shuras, biometrically recorded, vetted 
by the MOI and National Directorate of Security (NDS), and be between 18 and 45 years 
old. They should receive three weeks of training by U.S. forces in subjects like the 
Afghan constitution, rule of law, use of force, driver training, vehicle check point 
procedures, battle drills, marksmanship, morals and values, and a variety of other topics. 
There are significant concerns about whether this training is effective, considering some 
of the training is quite complex and according to reports that up to 90 percent of those 
working as ALP are illiterate.275  They can operate only in their own districts, and are 
supposed to be paid and provided for by the MOI. They sign yearly contracts, and after 
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Border Police (ABP). Salaries are approximately 60 percent of the base ANP salary. 
Reportedly, 16,000 men have been trained and incorporated into the ALP, as of 
September 2012.276 
Their mission is legally restricted. They can be used to protect international 
organizations and missions, protect key facilities and resources, and improve stability and 
security in local communities, according to Afghan law, and are only supposed to be 
organized in areas with a significant lack of security.277  However, rules of engagement 
are poorly-defined. The ALP supposedly cannot investigate or arrest, nor are they 
equipped or trained for offensive operations. They can detain members of insurgent 
forces, although these powers are not defined either—where, how, when, conditions of 
detention, or where detention will take place and for how long.278   
It is claimed that the MOI will oversee both the usage and development of the 
ALP, as well as the transfer process to other organizations (ANA, ANP, or the Afghan 
Border Police [ABP]).279  But the MOI struggles to provide adequate oversight on their 
own forces in locations where it has established a strong presence; the intent of the ALP 
is to exist in locations where security is poor and the GIRoA forces struggle to exert 
influence. Furthermore, ALP has already been in place for almost two years, and it is 
unclear if any transfer of personnel to ANA, ABP, or ANP has occurred in any location. 
F. IMPLEMENTATION OF ALP 
One of the ALP’s greatest successes advertised so far has been in Khakrez 
district, located in north-central Kandahar province. Khakrez is an agrarian district with 
about 20,000 rural residents. It was increasingly infiltrated by the Taliban after 2001, who 
by 2008 intimidated the local population into supporting them. In 2009, the U.S. SOF 
started local VSO, went to local tribal leaders and prioritized requirements, and 
established ALP. Emblems of success include an increase in business in local bazaars, 
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local informants against Taliban sympathizers, increases in local dispute resolution 
ability, the return of internally displaced persons, and increased tourism.280   
Outside Khakrez, the ALP and the VSO doctrine have been credited for a number 
of successes across Afghanistan. For instance, the ALP were assessed as radically 
improving the security situation in Sari Pul, in northern Afghanistan. ALP in this area are 
known to be former Taliban fighters and have tremendous advantages when it comes to 
other Afghans in terms of generating intelligence and contesting the tactics and strategy 
of the Taliban.281  An Afghan think-tank ascribed local successes to the ALP in Marjah, 
Musa Qala, and Sanjin districts in Helmand province and indicated that local leaders 
spoke positively about the ALP’s performance in Nuristan, Kunar, and Kunduz 
provinces.282  When Bismallah Khan served as the MOI chief, he argued that the ALP 
were so successful in the east and south that they needed to be replicated in greater 
numbers in the northern parts of Afghanistan,283 even though the violence in the northern 
parts of the country was lower.  
In the Zerko Valley, near Herat, successful implementation of VSO has been 
credited with not just reducing violence and improving the efficiency of targeted 
operations, but with improving local economics and reducing tribal frictions.284  
Brigadier-General Austin “Scott” Miller, Combined Forces Special Operations 
Component Commander (CFSOCC) commander in 2011, indicated the Zerko VSO was 
responsible for improving provincial politics in Kandahar.285  It is worth noting that the 
Herat area has never seen a significant Taliban influence, though Ismail Khan, a strong 
man, ex-mujahidin commander, and currently the Minister of Water and Energy for the 
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Karzai regime, still retains significant influence in the region. Many locals clearly link 
the empowerment of disciplined armed groups to the effectiveness of government, 
proclaiming they would cease all support for the government if the government 
sanctioned predatory or abusive militias.286 
In Baghlan province, the ALP experience has been very different. The ALP was 
introduced in August 2010, and almost immediately, local tribal leaders claimed they had 
not been consulted and they did not want the program. Police Lt. Col. Mohammid Asim 
Mangal, a district commander, concurred, saying in 2010, “We don’t really need this 
militia. The government needs to build the ANA and ANP instead of giving weapons to 
uneducated people who don’t know the rules.”287  The chief of the Baghlan provincial 
council, Mohammed Rasoul Mohsini, told Human Rights Watch in an interview in 2011, 
“The establishment of ALP did not happen in accordance with the MOI directive. Instead 
the Special Forces went to the thieves and brought in arbakis.”288  
An incident in Baghlan early in August 2010 highlights the dangers to U.S. forces 
of working too loosely with the ALP. An American patrol reportedly led a U.S.-ALP raid 
on a supposed Taliban leader’s residence, when the ALP brushed past them and directed 
fire into the ceiling of the house, frightening the family and enraging the local population. 
Though three individuals with connections to the Taliban were detained, the Americans 
made the situation worse by firing upon a shadow on the roof, which turned out to be a 
young boy, who died. Riots broke out in nearby communities, and the people blamed the 
ALP as much as the Americans for the death of the boy.289  More problematically, locals 
insist the boy was actually inside the home, but dragged outside and stabbed with a knife 
by the ALP,290 before he assumedly escaped and was accidentally shot. 
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In Baghlan, SOF was apparently interested in formalizing a group of individuals 
they had already worked with as the ALP. These men were mostly ex-Hizb-e-Islami 
(HIG) fighters, who reportedly had been pushed out of their area of operations by the 
Taliban.291  They were led by Nur al-Haq, labeled “a thief, a kidnapper and out of 
control”292 by the provincial council chief. Nur al-Haq claimed he joined HIG only 
because the provincial government could not protect the people from the Taliban who 
were ravaging his village, Shahabuddin.293 
Al-Haq has been engaged in a long conflict with the provincial governor, Rasoul 
Khan, who according to U.S. sources himself runs an armed militia and dominates local 
trade, including the drug trade. The fact Al-Haq is Pashtun and Rasoul Khan is Tajik is 
not lost on the United States, nor that in this province, Al-Haq’s tribe (Omarkhel) 
predominately supports the HIG while other tribes (Stanekzai) near Shahabuddin have a 
tendency to support the Taliban. The provinicial police chief, Gen. Abdur Rahim Rahimi, 
a Pashtun who himself complained that his predominantly Tajik force routinely ignores 
his orders and answers instead to Rasoul Khan, indicated that Al-Haq was an effective 
commander and provided local security—though at the urging of Rasoul Khan, he had 
opened at least one investigation against Al-Haq which he claimed Al-Haq refused to 
cooperate in.294  
Al-Haq threatened Rasoul Khan’s bid for provincial hegemony and bureaucratic 
control, in that individuals in the ALP were conducting illegal activity and Rahimi could 
not hold them accountable (by design, the ALP are supposed to fall under the ultimate 
authority of the provincial police chief) because of SOF intervention. The Special Forces 
commander, working with Al-Haq, called accusations against Al-Haq baseless and 
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indicated that both Al-Haq and SOF had indeed cooperated in the police chief’s 
investigations of wrong-doing in the area. SOF conjectured the police chief wanted to 
play both sides—to curry favor by complaining to the Tajiks about Al-Haq’s illegal 
activities, but to refrain from actually doing anything about him, because of the effective 
security he brought to the Pashtun areas, and SOF provided a convenient foil in the 
middle of it all. As Luke Mogelson writes: 
At the end of the day, the team leader said, the situation in Baghlan was 
enormously complicated, and you never truly knew whom to believe. 
‘We’re really trying to do the right thing,’ he [the SOF captain responsible 
for the relationship with the ALP] said. ‘One of my intelligence sergeants 
said it the right way: ‘Everybody in some way or form is a bad guy here. 
So you just have to pick the people who are less bad than others to work 
with you.295  
The tensions between GIRoA and locals, between ethnicities and tribes, and 
between competing interests collided when an ALP member, a Pashtun, heard that a 
relative of his, a 15-year-old boy, was being sexually abused by a local ANP commander, 
a Tajik. The Pashtun ALP confronted ANP members in a bazaar who worked for the 
Tajik commander, and they shot him in the street. An Afghan SOF non-commissioned 
officer, who literally stumbled upon the scene, attempted to intervene on behalf of the 
wounded Pashtun. The ALP was shot again and murdered, while observed by the Afghan 
SOF member. Within minutes, U.S. SOF, more Afghan SOF, angry ALP reinforcements, 
and the district police chief, along with additional ANP, confronted each other in the 
street. Predictably, sides commenced firing, including RPG fire, eventually prompting 
U.S. SOF to call in ISAF close-air support. Multiple ANP and ALP were wounded in the 
exchange. The local Tajik commander and the ANP who murdered the ALP have not 
been brought to justice. To SOF’s consternation, Rasoul Khan indicates the wounded 
ANP (which included the Tajik commander who allegedly abused the teen-aged boy) 
went to India for medical treatment.296  Years later, it is difficult to understand if justice 
has yet been administered, though General Rahimi has been removed. Hundreds more 




ALP are being generated and inserted into the local environment,297 but the situation on 
the ground regarding Nur Al-Haq, the governor, and the direction of the ALP remains 
murky.  
The ability of ALP, through VSO, to improve the quality of local governance, as 
well as the coordination between local, district, and provincial government, is generally 
portrayed as positive, though specifics are lacking. The Department of Defense reported 
to Congress in October 2011 that VSO had improved local governance and development 
throughout Afghanistan, though this report provided no specifics as to how governance 
and development was improved by VSO.298  Michael A. Sheehan, the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, indicated that VSO and 
ALP have indeed been successful at empowering their communities.299  None of these 
endorsements of VSO and the ALP are overwhelming in terms of events, metrics, or 
specifics.   
It is obvious that, as with many programs in Afghanistan, solutions to the frictions 
and issues associated with GIRoA and ISAF are important to the success of the program. 
Furthermore, it is obvious that the problems of Afghan society greatly impede the 
potential successes of the program. Even though the program has potential, it is clearly 
fraught with lingering problems. 
G. DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS IN THE ALP 
Outside of Baghlan, the ALP has experienced numerous problems since 2010. 
Two notorious incidents include the recent desertion of an entire ALP platoon to the side 
of the Taliban300 and the poisoning murders of several members of an ALP unit by 
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another member of the unit.301  Anti-U.S. protests have erupted in some locations over 
local retaliation murders which were supposedly conducted by ALP members, although 
at this time these individuals appear to have belonged to unofficial armed groups.302  
Several incidents, including shake-downs, unofficial taxes, and beatings, have been 
attributed to ALPs in northern Afghanistan.303 Interestingly, few of the notorious “blue-
on-green” attacks have been linked to ALP (only three of all of the attacks seem to have 
involved ALP),304 but this has not stopped ALP training from being suspended in 
September 2012 so that recruits could be re-investigated.305  Explanations have not been 
forthcoming as to why this training was suspended, but it seems likely that the ALP is a 
program that would be particularly vulnerable to insurgent and criminal infiltration.   
Some would argue the arbakai is essentially what the ALP and other local militias 
are.306  That is, this cultural precept has simply been lifted from the past and is now 
functioning in the modern day and age (with U.S. support and GIRoA funding) against 
the Taliban, right?  In actuality, no. The central government historically has very little or 
no influence over the arbakai’s actions. They answered to a local community who built 
them carefully to accomplish very specific purposes.  (If the central government needed 
local forces to provide personnel, almost always for a war, the tribe called a lashkar, 
which generally served for a limited amount of time). Furthermore, the arbakai typically 
were not paid (in fact, scholar Mohammed Osman Tariq indicated that being paid for this 
type of service was shameful). While they acted as a local police force, they were 
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intended to enforce borders and boundaries as well as to enforce the dictates of the shura 
and bring law and order, in ways consistent with pashtunwali and sharia. The ALPs 
throughout Afghanistan are not only paid and trained by the United States (in a fairly 
transparent way through the Afghan MOI), they clearly have divided loyalties—whether 
to the local community, U.S., or GIRoA. This has already been demonstrated in some 
fairly publicized, contentious cases, where both ALP and GIRoA asserted the ALP 
worked for and answered to U.S. forces. Both GIRoA and ISAF are doing a disservice to 
both GIRoA and the ALP by allowing the comparisons between ALP and arbakai to 
exist. 
This leads to another substantial problem facing the ALP: all too often, 
implementation of rules and requirements regarding the ALP has been lacking, leading to 
potentially large issues in the future. There are multiple indications that, in many 
locations, shuras never asked for the ALP to be set up in their local area, though perhaps 
technically, once they were convinced, their acquiescence accomplished the same effect. 
Obviously, this means the community is not as supportive of the ALP as both GIRoA and 
ISAF would hope, considering the ALP’s mandate, and furthermore, the ALP itself is 
distanced from the community in these locations. Citing the example of the arbakai, Don 
Rector argues “it is important that the ALP program be under the direction of and in 
coordination with the village elders. It must remain a local force, not directed by the 
national government, with the only mandate being that of local village defense.”307  If it 
is not their mandate, the local community will not even support it—which is clearly what 
has happened in multiple locations, with at least one example of individuals being 
snatched off the street and forced to serve in the ALP.308   
In some locations, the ALP does not answer to the district leadership in the way 
which ISAF or GIRoA intended. CW3 Stephen Rust, a warrant-officer in SOF, reiterates 
the importance of local community “buy-in” for effective functioning of the police force. 
While it must be stood up by the local community and it is partnered with a U.S. unit 
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(who bring much greater resources and firepower), it must answer to the local district-
level ANP commander.309  This does not seem to happen in some locations, meaning the 
ALP is taking on perspectives and missions which are not synchronized with the district 
leadership. Instead, especially in locations where pre-existing militias were incorporated 
en masse to the ALP, often the ALP answers instead to the province, or even ISAF. Even 
if the chain-of-command is happening correctly and the ALP are indeed answering to the 
district ANP commander, it must be remembered that many district-level ANP 
commanders create their own set of problems from incompetence or corruption.310 
The fact that local individuals are supposed to be nominated by the community 
and then vetted by MOI and the NDS is an excellent start toward ensuring the correct 
types of individuals are in the ALP. However, this too has been distorted in some 
locations; as already noted, in Baghlan, a local militia largely associated with the 
insurgent group HIG was incorporated into the ALP largely due to the influence of U.S. 
SOF. The recruitment of former insurgents can only be viewed as problematic. 
Predictably, many individuals who identify themselves as former Taliban are now 
members of the ALP.311  This would be less troublesome if Afghanistan had implemented 
an effective Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (DDR) 
program, but the militia leaders and warlords drove the building of the program in 2001 
according to their agendas, and it has been limited and inefficient ever since.312  Local 
community members know that former insurgents, criminals, and militiamen belong to 
the ALP, and though some are supportive, many are not. Many feel that criminals and 
terrorists are being empowered by this program to control local areas. Predictably, this is 
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problematic to local GIRoA officials, who look at some ALP units and are frightened to 
see the ANAP again or even warlord-led militias from the 1990s. 
Many European allies in ISAF are also unmotivated about the prospects the ALP 
bring to the security environment. Indeed, “UK officials…have expressed concerns over 
the ability of a home guard with only 40 hours’ training to keep the Taliban from taking 
back villages and towns from which the insurgents were driven out in the past two years.”  
Civilian aid organizations are more critical and see in it a re-hashing of the same failed 
strategies implemented just a few years ago. Brad Adams, Asia Director for Human 
Rights Watch, argues, “The ALP has come to be a key rationale for the U.S. drawdown, 
because they can’t do the training and equipping of the ANSF in time.”  Furthermore, 
“[t]he ALP is not supposed to have heavy weapons. If they now expect them to occupy 
space militarily to protect civilians from insurgents, they do not seem to be the right 
force. But if they are going to be that force, maybe they’re going to be just another 
militia.”313  
Sadly, the abuses committed by the ALP are predictable, and while headline-
grabbing, perhaps just one of the myriad issues associated with the ALP. Individuals with 
limited vetting (in reality) and limited training are simply going to revert to strategies of 
frustration and resentment when put in truly challenging situations. Abuses of the 
population, especially the most shocking crimes like murder and rape, will lessen over 
time as the ALP are better mentored and negative actors are removed from the 
organizations. However, offenses ranging from collection of illegal “taxes” to illegal 
detentions of “suspicious” personnel will be much more difficult to deal with, and will 
require consistent time and effort. Abuses within the ALP against other members of the 
ALP or ANP, however, will be even more difficult to deal with.314  Rapid and effective 
attention must be paid to these issues, however, if the ALP, and GIRoA by extension, 
intend to retain legitimacy. 
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In a pressing issue associated with the discourse on DDR and security, what will 
happen to the Afghans serving in the ALP when or if it does disarm?  When are any of 
them going to be incorporated into the ANP or ANA?  With proposed drawdowns 
seemingly certain for the size of Afghan forces,315 do any ALP truly have hopes of being 
integrated into the ANA or ANP?  It seems only reasonable to expect armed young men, 
who have received only a modicum of military training and who have little in the way of 
education or other prospects, from a culture that has seen hundreds of thousands of 
brothers and fathers and grandfathers turn to resistance, brigandage, and warlordism over 
the past 30 years, to form their own armed groups in an attempt to eke out a living. 
Brigadier General Jefforey Smith, recently NATO deputy commander for police training 
in Afghanistan, told journalist Luke Mogelson, “That’s the $64 million question. …In 
theory, the improvement of security over time creates opportunity for improved 
governance and economic development, and with that you have other employment 
opportunities that don’t exist today.”316  There is little evidence that such theories will 
prove valid, especially in the mountains of Afghanistan, which has probably crushed 
more theories than it has empires. 
It must be noted that the ALP is likely to be, at least partially, a victim of 
“mistaken identity.”  It has been reported that many militias have been organized and 
armed by provincial leadership without approval from Kabul.317  Some warlords have set 
up militias on their own318 (a common enough problem in Afghanistan), and locals are 
justifiably confused about what, where, and why something is legitimate. It is likely that 
some of the criticism that is directed against the ALP by Afghans is generated by the 
confusion vis-à-vis other groups and militias.   
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Perhaps most troubling, results of an unpublished Rand study indicate that levels 
of violence are no different in regions with ALP than before they had ALP.319  That is, 
there appears to be no statistical correlation between the existence of ALP and some sort 
of control exerted over the violence endemic to Afghanistan at a micro-level. While 
James Dobbins, former ambassador to Afghanistan and current director of the 
International Security and Defense Policy Center at Rand, calls that outcome 
successful,320 if violence existed at a level which is apparently so high it attracts the 
attention of U.S. forces, grew to an even higher level when U.S. forces came to the area, 
and then, after the establishment of ALP, dropped to the level it existed prior to the 
establishment of the ALP, the program seems wasteful, flawed, and redundant, since the 
ALP apparently lacks a consistent or measurable effect in improving security for the local 
population by reducing violence. 
H. CONCLUSION 
It is safe to say the ALP would never have been pursued as a strategy in 
Afghanistan without the influence of the United States as the “invited leviathan.”  The 
ALP emerged as a powerful idea in 2009 but they were initially funded by the United 
States and to this day are trained and mentored by U.S. forces. Some Afghans within the 
government and outside of the government have been deeply skeptical of the ALP and 
considering the lack of success the Afghans have experienced with local defense forces 
since 2001, it is difficult to expect much support for the program if it was not for the 
U.S.’s financing, training, and mentorship.   
The arbakai, is very different from the ALP in either practice or actuality.  
(General Petreaus himself has been careful to point out the distinctions).321  The arbakai 
are selected according to cultural precedent and led by local Pashtuns when a specific 
threat has been identified, and are disbanded when the threat has been neutralized. The 
                                                 
319 David S. Cloud and Laura King, “Afghan Police Units Tangled in Criminal Activity,” Los Angeles 
Times, May 14, 2012. 
320 Dan De Luce, “Pentagon Defends Afghan Local Police Program,” Armed Forces Press, May 14, 
2012. 
321 General David Petraeus, interview by Matthew Green, Financial Times, February 7, 2011. 
 82 
ALP is a local militia, trained for largely static missions by U.S. personnel, consistent 
with GIRoA policies, and “rubber-stamped” by local traditional leadership.   
VSO, and therefore ALP, are largely (if not entirely) U.S. ideas, and were indeed 
funded, equipped, and trained by the United States until the MOI was capable of taking it 
over. From the strategic level among U.S. and GIRoA leaders, the ALP is a program that 
is essentially organized, trained, and utilized, for the most part, as intended. Nonetheless, 
at the tactical level in the villages, valleys, and districts, the ALP is functioning in ways 
more consistent with the motivations and interests of local Afghan strong-men. This is 
because U.S. tactical units are willing to compromise when it comes to strengthening the 
state or extending the reach of the central government, since the metrics of the local 
government and the effectiveness of local security are their predominant concerns. 
Because the Afghan state has historically had a weak center, further intensified by 
30 years of conflict, the traditional power-brokers, tribes, and war-lords continue to exert 
the most significant influence at the local level. The ALP therefore provides an example 
of compromised state-building at the lowest level in Afghanistan.   
Reports from some districts are that the ALP, through the VSO doctrine, has 
provided the central government a method by which to reach local populations in a 
legitimate and extractive manner. This is clearly not the case in other districts, where the 
ALP has been subverted by local strong-men and has assumed predatory behavior that 
readily recalls the brutality of the 1990s—behavior which most of the citizenry abhors. It 
seems unlikely that the ALP, as an institution across the state, has contributed in a 
significant manner to improving the ability of the state to reach the citizenry in a 
responsible and competent fashion. 
It is too early to see the effect the ALP, as well as the series of armed groups since 
2001, have truly had on the development of the state of Afghanistan. There is no doubt 
that a number of talented, intelligent, and hard-working individuals are overseeing the 
program and continually improving it, and the results of training stand-down in 
September 2012 are so far unknown. The United States has spent a significant amount of 
intellectual and materiel capital in developing VSO doctrine and implementing the ALP 
across Afghanistan. But a true measure of effectiveness lies in the ways such programs 
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are embraced by the state they are ostensibly designed to support, and in the effects these 
programs have in facilitating the local population’s acceptance of the central government. 


























Despite the fact that many “practitioners” (in this case, military personnel and 
individuals working for the U.S. government) are often characterized as being almost 
uncritically supportive of the idea of militias,322 and conversely, that the discourse of 
most scholars and policy-makers is viewed as fearful of militias,323 the reality is that 
militias or armed groups are complex creations of very specific circumstances and 
geography, are highly dependent on particular strong men, criminals, militaries, 
politicians, bureaucrats, and a myriad of other factors in the local environment, vary 
widely in their organizational motivations, and have different outcomes. There is little 
real empirical evidence regarding militias; however, case-studies provide a useful method 
for understanding the effects these militias have on state-building, and vice versa.   
Militias can be effective actors for controlling violence, as in Iraq. They can also 
be vehicles for inclusion of groups into the institutions of the state, which theoretically 
reduces the volume of discontent against the regime in charge, and which ideally reduces 
participation in insurgency. The militias can, however, be less successful. In Afghanistan, 
the record of the ALP has been mixed thus far, and seems to have little to no effect on 
inclusion or the population’s perceptions of the Karzai government. Though violence has 
been reduced in some locations, it has not in others, and it is uncertain as to whether the 
ALP has a measurable effect on local security. 
Militias have a high propensity to result in compromised state-building. The 
implementation of the SOI did, while the ALP has had a less tangible effect on what is 
already a deeply compromised state. It remains to be seen, however, how debilitating 
compromised state-building actually is. 
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B. EFFECT OF SOI ON IRAQ 
While some analysis of the SOI has been quite acclamatory in terms of its 
outcomes,324 it is important to recall that there were a number of very specific 
phenomena associated with the development of the SOI.   
The strong men, or the sheikhs, had been empowered in specific ways for close to 
two decades by Saddam Hussein and, therefore, a large segment of the Iraqi population 
viewed them as legitimate leadership. Sources of legitimacy are varied but strong men 
must have some sort of legitimacy in order for their armed groups to exert influence that 
is not entirely dependent on the control of violence. These sheikhs needed sources of 
patronage to maintain their own influence, and they were in conflict with AQI over 
control of sources of revenue, social control, and violence. It is obvious that genuine 
grievance, in this case the competition over resources, social control, and violence, drives 
the emergence of these armed groups.   
By 2006, AQI, despite their intense recruitment of locals and their partnership 
with other insurgent groups, committed egregious errors that eroded support from among 
the Sunni population for AQI (and especially eroded support for AQI within the 
nationalist resistance). Not all insurgencies have fissures in them, neither do 
organizations always make exploitable mistakes.   
Though it had been attempted previously, it was not until 2006 that the sheikhs 
were able to create an alliance that had the weight to oppose AQI. Also, by 2006, U.S. 
units had matured in their understanding of COIN and state-building, but more 
importantly, in their grasp of Iraqi culture and politics. As such, they were willing to 
support the sheikhs financially, militarily, and politically as they attempted to implement 
their plans for local security. It was critically important that an effective partnership, 
which was conceived and organized at the local level by local strong men, was instituted 
before the militia came into existence.  
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The Iraqi government put aside their suspicions and acquiesced to the sheikhs and 
U.S. leadership in order to organize and better support the Sahwa and the SOI, and as 
time progressed, took over the program and incorporated these individuals into the 
government. That GoI was prodded and pushed to take actions toward accepting the SOI 
cannot be overlooked.   
GoI’s reluctance to support the SOI reflects the uncomfortable reality that Iraq 
needed to make enormous progress in order to become a highly functional state. Intense 
internal disputes over institutions, representation, resources, and control continue to put 
the state in a precarious position. The U.S. decision to align with local strong men and 
develop militias did indeed provide security and allow the United States to redeploy 
forces, but the cost may have been the reinvigoration of “shadow state” institutions. As 
Iraq expert Toby Dodge warned, if the strong men of the “shadow state” exert control 
over the institutions of the state, “a veneer of legal-rational bureaucracy will have been 
placed on top of the shadow state with its tried and tested use of violence, patronage, and 
favoritism.”325  While there are some indications that this may have occurred, it is too 
early to parse through the variety of issues in the state of Iraq and stay that this has 
definitively happened. 
C. EFFECT OF ALP ON AFGHANISTAN 
The history of militias in Afghanistan is far different from Iraq. Likewise, the 
history of the state as an ontological device is also very different in Afghanistan. Strong 
men and militias have been responsible not just for massive casualties and the destruction 
of Kabul in the 1990s, but also for the defeat of the Taliban (in partnership with U.S. 
forces in 2001–2002) and the protection of the nascent state in 2002 and 2003. 
Consequently terms like “warlord,” “strong man,” “militia,” and “arbakai” have become 
almost pejoratives among the population in Afghanistan, loaded with meanings and 
histories that Westerners often do not fully grasp. 
State-sponsored militias have been used in Afghanistan since 2001, with generally 
poor results. The CDI, AP3, CDF, ANAP, and plethora of lesser known programs have 
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uniformly failed to achieve significant results, but the United States has continually 
learned from the experiences, and funded new variations on the theme. The ALP is a 
program that was designed with the errors of previous programs in mind, as well as a 
belief in the traditional systems of the Afghans. Results, however, so far have been 
mixed. 
ALP personnel have been involved in human rights violations and predatory 
behavior, which local populations have protested. It also appears that the ALP does not 
improve the local security situation in many of the communities in which they operate. It 
is difficult to see how the program improves the perception of legitimacy for the district, 
provincial, or central government.   
The position of the Karzai government toward the ALP is nebulous at this time. 
Karzai announced the establishment of the ALP in 2010, and his government has 
superficially funded it (the justification of funding for individual programs by a 
government that receives 97 percent of its revenue from aid, mostly from the United 
States, is problematic on a number of levels).326  The program does not accomplish, in a 
high volume, what the United States intended for it to provide (local security) and in 
many locations it has clearly been twisted by strong men into militias serving their 
interests. There is no doubt that the ALP program constitutes an example of compromised 
state-building in Afghanistan.   
As in Iraq, however, it remains to be seen whether compromised state-building 
will be satisfactory. Compromised state-building, considering the prominence of strong 
men, the centralization of the relatively weak state under Karzai, and the massive 
international presence, seems a likely outcome for almost any state-building endeavor in 
Afghanistan. In the case of the ALP, compromised state-building seems unlikely to be 
enough to improve the quality of local governance. 
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D. LESSONS LEARNED 
There are numerous lessons to be learned from the SOI and ALP case-studies. 
Local militias can indeed improve the ability of the central state to govern, but certain 
circumstances must occur. It is also noted that in the case of the SOI and the ALP, a set 
of very specific circumstances existed: a trilateral relationship between three parties (the 
militias, the host state, and the external state), and that the external state was the United 
States, who regularly exerts more military, economic, and political influence than any 
other power on the globe today. 
In a developing state, especially in a post-conflict environment, militias are likely 
already in existence. Post-conflict states, especially those with imposed polities, are prone 
to political instability and violence.327  State-level leaders may control patronage and 
access to markets and use the threat of violence to control the state. In such an 
environment, militias pose their own political economy.328  As Klare argues, when 
violence increases, the likelihood that local populations will assume responsibility for 
their own security increases.329  It is likely, then, that post-conflict state-builders will 
come into contact with militias, and must formulate a strategy for how to deal with them 
ahead of time. In Afghanistan, for instance, the United States knew very well that militias 
existed in the 1990s and alliances were forged in 2001 in order to destroy the Taliban 
regime with these militias. As the state was formed, the militias became part of the 
government, and were continually viewed as a viable organism for imparting security. 
That none of the state-sponsored militias have worked adequately does not alter that fact. 
It is critical that all parties—the peace-builders or “external leviathan,” the state 
elites, and the strong men or subnational elites—invest in the militia program for it to be 
relatively successful. In this case, “success” can be defined in any variety of ways 
depending on security requirements as well as local conditions, but at minimum, success 
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is a program that provides local security, acts in a relatively legitimate and ethical 
manner, and does not degrade the sovereignty of the state. In Iraq, all three parties were 
intensely invested in the Sahwa and then the SOI in 2006 and 2007. Strong men in Anbar 
were tired of AQI’s impingement on their profit-making endeavors and efforts to control 
the Sunni population, as well as the potential for patronage opportunities they sensed 
elsewhere. U.S. forces, weary after three years of rising conflict, were desperate for a 
sliver of light, some sort of positive change from the endless cycle of sectarian killings 
and anti-U.S. violence, and they had plenty of resources and effort to channel into a 
winning strategy. The Iraqi government was afraid of Sunni empowerment but even more 
afraid of losing control of the government, and since they were deeply obligated to U.S. 
wishes, they aggressively supported the SOI. 
In a related manner, support must be given and control must be exerted over the 
militia. The Sahwa, and then SOI, were partnered with U.S. units who, for the most part, 
implemented close partnerships. These militias were vulnerable to AQI predation and, 
early on, lacked significant resources to defend themselves; the intelligence they 
generated and the tactics they used, since they had many ex-insurgents in their ranks, cut 
both ways. Strong men could easily pervert these militias to their purposes (which has 
occurred in Afghanistan). U.S. forces recognized that the potential collapse of these 
militias had strategic consequences that belied their tactical influence on the local 
battlefield. To ensure they were not overwhelmed, U.S. forces provided them with 
medical care, close-air support and armed reinforcement, logistical support, and various 
other battlefield support—and in the halls of power at the provincial and national level. 
Conversely, since militia have a high potential for atrocity and predatory behavior,330 
U.S. forces monitored their actions and coordinated activity with the Iraqi government. 
The Iraqi government was concerned about the influence of these groups and 
implemented controls on their actions, which was supported by the United States, 
including prosecuting SOI who committed crimes.  
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Because of the high potential for predatory behavior that may cause strategic 
effects that far outweigh the tactical value of the militia, the militias must be carefully 
organized. Successful and effective militias must be trained and/or competent at their 
tasks. In the case-study of Iraq, although training provided to the SOI was uneven and 
uncoordinated at the highest levels, the missions of the SOI were generally understood by 
the SOI and the partnership between most U.S. units (and, increasingly, Iraqi military 
units) ensured the SOI generally stuck to basic security tasks. Furthermore, it is likely 
that a large percentage of the individuals participating in not just the Sahwa but the SOI 
were ex-Iraqi military, active or ex-tribal guardsmen, and ex-insurgents—individuals 
who were familiar with weapons, basic principles of small-unit tactics, intelligence-
gathering, and who were motivated by conducting militia activity for reasons which went 
beyond collecting a paycheck. In the ALP, on the other hand, the training and oversight 
of individuals regarding their tasks does not appear adequate. 
Because militias are vulnerable to serious insurgent retaliations and U.S. forces 
cannot be physically present at all times, strength needs to be reinforced. That is, militias 
appear more successful if they are developed and strengthened in locations where the 
local population has already largely rejected the insurgent ideology. There were steps 
toward militia organizations in Iraq prior to the Sahwa in 2006, but they did not work for 
a variety of reasons—one of which was that the balance of power was often against them. 
When the Sahwa emerged in late 2006, the Anbar tribes were already in violent conflict 
with AQI, and the United States proved to be a viable partner in terms of reinforcing 
success. Even though combat was a near-daily occurrence for the Sahwa and SOI through 
2006 and 2007, they knew that most of the local communities supported them and had 
turned against AQI’s extremist ideology. Furthermore, the government supported them, 
and the population was vested in the government enforcing security, even it was through 
the strength of the SOI. Conversely, it seems uncertain that ALP stood up in Afghanistan 
are in areas where the population fully rejects Taliban or anti-GIRoA ideology. 
A plan for disarmament must be designed into any plan for usage of militias, 
unless militias are conceived as part of the long-term plan for local security (which was 
not the case in Iraq and does not appear to be the case in Afghanistan). In the long-term, 
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when security is established and widespread overt violence has ended, the state’s military 
and police must not compete with local armed groups who act in provincial interests, as 
the state’s law, order, and enforcement mechanisms would therefore be disrupted. The 
incorporation of these individuals into the government’s security forces is a viable option, 
as are re-training and education programs associated with DDR arrangements. In Iraq, a 
large number of SOI have been incorporated into the military and other ministries of the 
state. A provision is in place to do the same in Afghanistan, though implementation 
remains to be seen. 
One of the important points that can be gleaned from U.S. experiences working 
with the SOI and ALP is this: compromised state-building is a form of state-building that 
can be effective and worthwhile. In Iraq, compromised state-building led to a reduction in 
violence state-wide, inclusion for groups into the Iraqi government (most of whom were 
Sunni), and new actors in national and local politics, many of whom exerted leadership. 
From a U.S perspective, the process by which state-building was compromised also 
resulted in the means to re-direct forces, resources, and strategy, and eventually effect the 
draw-down and re-deployment. Compromised state-building may indeed be the most 
preferred outcome when one objectively considers the entire process of state-building in a 
post-conflict developing state. Strong men and other local subnational elites may view 
compromised statebuilding as a good process in which they shape a participatory process 
for their future. Peace-builders are still likely to lay a framework upon the state that 
creates a form of government which, at the very least, is preferred over the previous 
government, and which responds in some way to the peace-builders. State elites will gain 
prestige and resources from outside of the state (from the peacebuilders) while they 
continue to work with subnational elites and strong men adjusting the form of state as 
well as important issues like security and resource-sharing. In this case, compromised 
state-building must also formalize these negotiated principles in order for the state to 
develop truly improved institutions.331  
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E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
There is a dearth of specific evidence regarding the effects of SOI on the function 
of the Iraqi state. Furthermore, our understanding of the civil-military relationship in 
Anbar as well as the Iraqi state as a whole has lost fidelity since the U.S. military 
withdrawal in 2011. Reliance on interviews and published works regarding the 
Awakening and the SOI was useful, but it is clear that the perspective of the “common 
Iraqi” who might have been involved in the insurgency, crime, tribal relations, the 
Awakening, and/or the SOI was lacking. The data that has been gathered lacks some 
specificity on the themes addressed in this thesis. Critically evaluated and dispassionate 
analysis is beginning to emerge from the Iraq conflict but much remains to be developed. 
The ALP are a relatively new phenomenon and the data which has been published 
about this program so far largely comes from humanitarian Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) on one side, and from the U.S. military community on the other. 
Each side has certain agendas. Journalists have written about the program, as well, but, at 
least partially since the program is still growing and developing, the program lacks a truly 
detailed, comprehensive analysis which examines the program critically at the local, 
provincial, and national-level. The current environment is politically charged and with 
U.S. forces still growing the ALP at this time, it is unlikely that more specific, critical, 
and dispassionate analysis will come for some time. 
The U.S. military is in the process of finalizing the re-write of FM 3–24 
Counterinsurgency at this time. The implications of the use of militias in U.S. doctrine 
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